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With the failures of many large scale conservation projects, conservation sites have become 
sites of conflict over resources and discourses. This thesis looks at situation of Komodo 
National Park, in Flores, eastern Indonesia where an international Non-Governmental 
Organisation (NGO), The Nature Conservancy, in partnership with a private company, has 
developed a 25 year Management Plan for the park amidst great opposition from local 
communities and local NGOs. I explore the bases for conflict and contestation of this plan 
and discuss how it fails to consider the real plight of park residents, penalising them instead 
and promoting the interests of the wealthy and powerful.  Hajer puts forward the argument 
that environmental conflict provides a symbolic umbrella, an inclusionary device, that 
confines the political debate and ensuing discourse production to specific actors and 
institutions. Thus, the debate has become a discursive one, revolving around interpretation, 
rather than dealing with the physical nature of environmental problems. (Hajer 1995: 14). 
Despite the ensuing media attention due to the shooting of two fishermen in 2002 by patrol 
forces, I show how the use of multiple storylines continues to obscure the real issues of 




This thesis could not have been completed or undertaken without the contributions of 
the following people and institutions. 
 
My supervisor, Associate Professor Maribeth Erb for her guidance, generosity and 
unflagging efforts to see this thesis through. Her kindness and friendship have 
extended far beyond the walls and office hours of NUS. 
 
The Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, for their continued 
support and endorsement of my candidature, in particular, past department heads 
Professors Hing Ai Yun and Lian Kwen Fee, as well as present head Associate 
Professor Tong Chee Kiong. 
 
The Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Division of Graduate Studies for their 
funding of my fieldwork in 2003; my parents, for their sponsorship of my last year of 
candidature. 
 
I also gratefully acknowledge the generosity and kindness of the many respondents I 
have met in the course of research in Labuan Bajo and in Komodo National Park.  My 
fieldwork was a profound learning experience, many times isolating and frightening, 
punctuated with laughter and joy. Thanks to Any and her wonderful extended family 
in Ruteng, Ohm Piher in Pulau Seraya Kecil, friends at Loh MBongi and most of all 
Bhiksu Bataona, who have  always made me welcome in their  homes and lives, 
providing respite from the occasional discomforts of research and much food for 
thought. 
 
A big thank you to friends such as  Nor Baikah and Uncle ‘Reframe Your Mind’ How 
who have stood by me and cheered me on in the last arduous legs of writing.  
 
And lastly, my gratitude and affection goes to Kit, for his love, boundless faith and 






























Figure 1: Map of Komodo National Park (Walpole and Goodwin 2000: 562) 
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Figure 2: Villages in and around Komodo National Park where fieldwork was carried out 
(adapted from PKA and TNC 2000a: 14).  
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The Komodo National Park (KNP), located in Eastern Indonesia, just west of the island of 
Flores, became the focus of media attention in Indonesia in late 2002, when two unarmed 
fishermen were shot dead by ranger patrols for allegedly fishing illegally within the park 
boundaries. At the centre of the storm was an American Non Governmental Organization 
(NGO), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), that had funded the patrol boats in the park. These 
patrol boats were just one of several  measures, considered draconian by some,  that limited 
park access and curtailed fishing activity in KNP. These various new measures, introduced by 
The Nature Conservancy were seen by opponents as indirectly leading to the shooting of the 
fisherman. 
Earlier in 2002, in the Komodo National Park, considerable concern had been raised 
because of the TNC’s proposed ‘joint venture’ with a private company (Putri Naga Komodo), 
to manage the Komodo National Park for twenty-five years (Dhume 2002, Borchers 2002, 
Erb 2005). Arriving in Labuan Bajo, the town on the western coast of Flores, where the 
Komodo National Park headquarters is located in early 2003, not long after the shootings, and 
still in the thick of considerable controversy over this incident, many people were reluctant to 
answer questions regarding The Nature Conservancy. Speaking to boat operators and tour 
guides, there seemed to be a climate of uncertainty about TNC’s future path of action in the 
face of the shooting of two unarmed fishermen. Respondents were unwilling to commit 
themselves to an opinion on TNC, short of saying that at that point in time, the TNC 
regulations had had little impact on their lives. Respondents did express concern about the 
heavy handed measures TNC had used against unarmed fishermen, and had some opinions as 
well as about the emergence of Putri Naga Komodo, and the management collaboration with 
TNC that might attempt to monopolise and regulate activities within the park. Because of my 
considerable interest in conservation, I was sympathetic to the TNC’s work, and wanted to 
unravel what were the problems that had been emerging in the Komodo National Park. Why 
had there been so much controversy surrounding the TNC? Why had there been particularly 
so much controversy surrounding this particular national park?  
 As my research in the park unfolded over the subsequent months, I came to question 
whether or not this park could be considered a success or whether the considerable  
conservation efforts of the TNC itself, though often praised on the one hand, could actually 
either be said to be successful. Additionally, my research efforts uncovered many different 
agendas, as they were held by different members of the Labuan Bajo community. Many 
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people living in the national park, or in the town took the opportunity to oppose the TNC, but 
were their reasons for opposing the TNC simply because they saw them as being too heavy-
handed in their enthusiasm to conserve the “Earth’s Last Great Places”? After awhile I found 
the cacophony of voices increasingly perplexing, and the motives of individuals increasingly 
opaque. 
 In order to make sense of the conflicts that have occurred in the Komodo National 
Park, as well as the differing positions held by actors within and around the park, I have 
found that Maarten Hajer’s concept of “story-lines” (1995) has helped me to put the debates 
and conflicts into perspective. Hajer argues environmental conflict provides a symbolic 
umbrella, an inclusionary device, that confines the political debate and ensuing discourse 
production to specific actors and institutions. Thus, the debate has become a discursive one, 
revolving around interpretation, rather than dealing with the physical nature of environmental 
problems (Hajer 1995: 14). To better understand the discursive environment that surrounds 
environmental problems, Hajer operationalizes the effect of such discourses on practice 
through the use of story- lines (ibid: 52). A story-line is a convenient means for actors to 
understand the diverse discourses that surround physical or social phenomena, consequently 
positioning themselves as subjects within social structures. According to Haajer, story-lines 
become an important form of agency as they shape the discursive order (ibid: 56). 
 
Story-lines…not only help to construct a problem, they also play an important role in 
the creation of a social and moral order in a given domain. Story-lines are devices 
through which actors are positioned, and through which specific ideas of ‘blame’ and 
‘responsibility’, and of ‘urgency’ and of ‘responsible behaviours’ are attributed. 
Through story-lines actors can be positioned as victims ……, as problem solvers, as 
perpetrators, as top scientists, or as scaremongers (Haajer 1995: 64-65). 
 
“Story lines” are thus a political device that provide a semblance of coherence for discourse 
closure. Storylines reduce discursive complexity by becoming easily accessible through 
frequent use in the discursive debate. By invoking a storyline, the main storyline in the 
discourse can be recalled. Over time, the storyline becomes ritualized as a metaphor that lends 
credence to and rationalizes the debate. (Haajer 1995: 62-63)  
Story lines are central in what Haajer calls the argumentative approach to 
environmental conflict, where politics is conceived as a struggle for hegemony. (Haajer 1995: 
59) Actors who are attracted to and use similar story lines (though they might have different 
interests) while taking part in practices in which this discursive activity is based are part of  
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“discourse- coalitions”.  Discourse-coalitions are thereby formed when a common discourse 
connects previously independent practices in a single political project (ibid: 65). 
  In the case of the Komodo National Park, the formation of discourse coalitions of 
resistance specifically centres around the prevailing discourses within Indonesian national and 
regional politics, and in this sense, cannot be considered independently. Recent upheavals in 
the political order and the declaration of regional autonomy provided a political space for 
negotiation and resistance that previously did not exist. The ousting of the Suharto regime in 
1998, on the basis of gross human rights abuses and corruption popularized the notion of 
“people power” and democracy. The defining feature of the New Order government was its 
rule from the centre (i.e. Jakarta) but this was supposed to change with regional autonomy, 
where control over natural resources was relinquished to regional governments across 
Indonesia. In this way, decentralization plays a key in the creation of Komodo National Park 
as a site for collective action, in particular, as we will see, the central government’s refusal to 
relinquish control of the park, whilst working within the discourses of democracy and 
regional autonomy.   
 As story lines must be recognisable and located within the dominant discourse, they 
are a good starting point to tease apart the various interests that surround each one, as they 
allow for a wide variety of possibly competing interests. They also provide insight into the 
processes of knowledge production on an individual level (Hajer 1995: 66-7). Each story line 
had a familiar theme, one that aimed to resonate with its targeted audience - that of human 
rights infringements ala Ordre Baru, the neo-colonial struggle against the Western oppressor, 
but in the form of ‘bio-centrism’ (respondents in NGO circles often used the term) or the 
theme of resistance (be it of imposed identities, regulations etc). Story-lines is also a useful 
departure point for analysis as methodologically, people often use these storylines in 
interviews to position themselves within the debate about TNC. The choice of story-line 
concurrently was dependent on how respondents positioned themselves in the prevailing 
social structure, showing how they felt constrained or enabled by it. 
 
Dragons, Conservation and Tourism: The Formation of a National Park 
 
The island of Komodo lies between the major islands of Flores and Sumbawa. Together with 
the islands of Pandar and Rinca (and now, everything in between), they form what is known 
today as the Komodo National Park. The major attraction in the Park has traditionally been 
the Komodo Dragon (Varanus komodoensis), touted as the largest lizard in the world. The 
fecund waters around this archipelago of islands are also a burgeoning site for dive tourism. 
Aside from its obvious economic value as a tourist destination, the waters and islands around 
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Komodo also have much cultural and historical value, as they lie between former centres of 
power in the region, the Bimanese Sultanate and kingdom of Manggarai. The relationship of 
Komodo to these centres of power had a large role in the formation of the communities that 
now reside in the park. 
However, the most famous inhabitant of the park must be the Komodo Dragon. This 
large monitor’s occurrence in the archipelago has resulted in many acts of legislation that 
have primarily been to protect its numbers. However, since its discovery in 1910, the 
archipelago has also undergone immense social change, in part due to the changing political 
climate in Indonesia, but to a certain extent because of external influence from the 
international community in the creation of Komodo National Park. The focus in legislation 
has reflected these changing concerns, where the locus of legislation has steadily grown 
larger, initially focusing on just the dragon, expanding to include its terrestrial habitat, and 
finally expanding to include the waters and islands off Komodo, Rinca and Padar. Along the 
same vein, legislation has also grown steadily exclusive in nature for the humans in the park, 
where communities find themselves increasingly subject to such legislation, limiting their 
access to resources in and around the park. 
Komodo was depicted as a place of exile in the 19th century as well as a slave 
settlement. Located between Manggarai and Bima, its role as a tributary of Bima as an 
interim area that criminals were held before receiving punishment, likely under guard/ watch 
by a representative from the Sulatan of Bima. Komodo thus became a subordinate in Asi, a 
tributary of the Kingdom of Bima. According to Verheijen, during his visit to Bima in 1947, 
he had heard that the ancestors of Komodo had also fled to Bima due to pirate attacks 
(Verheijen 1982: 4). 
Komodo’s harbour was described as being peaceful, strategically located between the 
trading route of Dutch colonized Manggarai and Sumbawa. According to one of Verheijen’s 
respondents, Abdulrajab, boats bringing tribute to Bima annually, would stop by Komodo. 
Tribute included harvests from other tributaries, as well as slaves. Komodo also offered 
tribute of candles, the alcohol of lontar palm and pearls to the Sultan of Bima. Assam was 
also an important export in the trade with Bima (Verheijen 1982: 5). 
In 1905, Bima was incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies. The relationship 
between the Dutch VOC and Bima had been, prior to this, maintained by a series of trading 
contracts. However, with the collapse of the VOC on the Dutch stock exchange in 1798, the 
Dutch government took control over its assets, and in this way, the Netherland East Indies 
was born. (Hitchcock 1996: 34- 35) However, the relationship between the Dutch and the 
Bimanese Sultanate continued to be defined by contracts throughout the 19th century. In 1905, 
the boundaries of the Sultanate were redrawn as Bima was incorporated into the Netherlands 
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East Indies, relinquishing control of Manggarai and Komodo to the Resident of Timor. The 
modern boundaries are largely based on those set down by the Dutch (ibid: 35). 
During this time, the Komodo Dragon, rather than the territory of Komodo, had been 
the subject to some legal protection. In 1912, the Sultan of Bima, then ruler of Komodo and 
its surrounding areas, at the behest of the Netherlands Indies Society for the Protection of 
Nature, issued a decree forbidding the hunting and capture of the lizard. Another decree was 
issued in 1926 by the authorities in Manggarai, Western Flores, becoming effective in 1930 
when Bima relinquished jurisdiction of Komodo to the colonial government. (Hitchcock 
1993:304) In 1938, Pulau Padar and Rinca were declared wildlife reserves (suaka 
margasatwa). Pulau Komodo was only declared a reserve in 1965. The three islands were 
declared as Komodo National Park  in 1980. In 1991, United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) announced KNP as a World Heritage Site, and 
subsequently, under Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia No. 44/ 1992, the 
Komodo dragon became a protected animal under law.  
The first step towards the creation of a park was the demarcation of Komodo as State 
territory, when the State assumed ownership of all land under the 1945 constitution, by 
suppressing adat law and refusing to recognize customary ownership of land and resources 
(Baines and Hendro 2000: 136). To solidify and maintain the integrity of the new Republic 
Indonesia, this move would have made sense to prevent further interference by the Dutch as 
the Dutch had attempted to retain colonial control by creating a puppet state, Negara 
Indonesia Timur (Hitchcock 1996:36).  
 
Peluso notes that  
the late colonial period in Southeast Asia… is notably characterized by the 
emergence of an increasing number of territorial states. Using land and forest laws, 
these colonial and nascent national bureaucratic states establish territorial 
mechanisms through which states and state agencies could control both resources and 
the activities of their subjects seeking access to those resources. (Peluso 2003:231) 
 
With Indonesian Independence, the force of the nation state and its mechanisms 
began to define the form of Pulau Komodo. The desa system was implemented, carving out 
the various villages into enclaves, each accountable to a hierarchy of leaders, enabling the 
State to have better control over the vast archipelago. During this time, several rebellions 
broke out against the Nationalists in Sulawesi, as well as Ambon, resulting in some migration 
to the islands around Komodo. Legislation pertaining to the Komodo continued to be 
enforced by the Indonesian government after Independence with ‘equal vigour’, preventing 
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Western collectors such as David Attenborough from taking the animals that had been 
trapped. (Hitchcock 1993: 305)  
However, in recent times, focus of conservation efforts by international agencies has 
shifted to protection of the marine biodiversity in and around the park. Presently, The Nature 
Conservancy, an American Non Government Organization (NGO) is the largest international 
stakeholder in KNP.  
TNC was invited by the Indonesian Government to find a long-term private sector 
financing solution for the KNP that would ‘ensure the environmental health of the park and 
benefit the local economy’ (Leiman 2002: 1). Since 1996, TNC has gone about developing a 
management framework, promoting alternative livelihood programmes and capacity building 
for local communities. TNC has an annual budget of US$250, 000 for this project and expects 
to pump in another US$5 million during the next five years. The budget for 1996 to 1997 was 
$US360 000 (Wells et al 1999: 101). In 2000, in co-operation with the Directorate General of 
Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (Perlindungan Hutan dan Pelastarian Alam/ 
PHPA), The Nature Conservancy has drafted a 25 year Management Plan for the park  
(Leiman 2002: 1). 
 
Research in the Park 
 
It was under this climate of suspicion that I entered KNP to find out more about community 
perceptions and experiences with this formidable International NGO. In April 2003, I spent 2 
months in KNP visiting several villages and talking to fishermen living around the park, as 
well as interviewing some people in the nearest town, Labuan Bajo. It was not easy to glean 
information from the any of the people at that point of time—many were suspicious that I was 
a ‘spy’ from TNC, others admitted later that they did not want to risk being associated with 
saying anything negative about TNC as they were concerned that their access to resources 
might somehow be curtailed (through new (selective) laws or harassed by patrols), but the 
majority of fishermen at that point of time had adopted a wait and see attitude with regards to 
the promises and plans of TNC and the park authority (Taman Nasional Komodo / TNK). 
However, despite the reports of widespread opposition, I felt that though TNC was regarded 
with some suspicion, most fishermen did not want to have anything to do with them and just 
wanted to be left alone to get on with their lives. 
What was significant about the shooting incident was that it had opened a can of 
worms, in that this flagrant and unnecessary use of violence provided opponents to TNC’s 
programs a space to contest the right of TNC to operate in KNP. Previously, TNC had used 
the discourse of science, scientists and other experts to negate and argue for their 
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programmes, marginalizing local voices in the process and avoiding negotiation with the local 
communities. However, with the shooting of the fishermen from Sape, a whole new discourse 
was now available to opponents of TNC. The discourse of human rights (hak assisi manusia) 
which had been extensively used in the mass media in the overthrow of Suharto was now 
used by activists and locals alike to decry the heavy handedness of TNC.  
In this way, the local communities were able to rally somewhat effectively against 
TNC. It is also against this backdrop that many local NGOs and activists emerged to lead 
various groups in the call for the withdrawal of TNC from KNP. I seek to examine the 
‘conservation encounter’ of local people with such activists and local NGOs. Through 
interviews with a local NGO, I see how such discourses are shaped to frame and articulate 
community concerns. Besides the use of discourse at a NGO-Community level, I also 
examine how power holders in community use discourse to articulate their dominance over 
other members and in this way not only further solidify their positions but might also stymie 
efforts to effectively engage these members of the community.  
 
Communities within KNP 
 
To better understand the dynamics of each village as well as the reluctance to openly discuss 
TNC, I conducted many interviews and conversations about the origins of park residents. I 
asked them where had they come from, how long had they lived in the park as well discussed 
their future in the park. As an outsider, this gave me some understanding of village dynamics, 
politics and identity within these villages. The interplay between individuals and groups of 
different ethnicities, economic and social positions also revealed differences in the framing 
and perception of not just TNC policies but how each group framed their relationship with 
each other.  
I also examine the introduction of a new Coastal Zonation Policy (CZP) in 2002. To 
date, little has been done in terms of enforcement on the ground as there are considerable 
logistical difficulties. I examine the importance of the use of boundaries to order and control 
resources in a conservation project to managers of such projects, even though such boundaries 
are technically meaningless to day-to-day users. I also would like to contrast this to show how 
once boundaries are set, are generally difficult to revoke and this has severe consequences on 
how property within those boundaries are managed. I look at the case of Pak Steph, who 
despite clear legislation pertaining to national park boundaries, is fighting an ongoing battle 
for the past 20 years for compensation of lost property due to the drawing of park boundaries. 
What are the implications for KNP should the park compensate him for taking over his 
orchards, gardens and hoofstock? What are the implications for other residents of KNP?  
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Despite the widespread opposition and open criticism of TNC tactics, I also examine 
the  structural obstacles to change in TNC, as well as the situation of INGOs in the global 
climate of fund raising and project management. The corporatization of INGOs also has 
significant implications for the future of environmental protection. How did these 
organizations begin and how have they managed to grow?  What were the historical 
conditions that allowed INGOs like TNC to flourish? Along the same thread, the pattern of 
failure of conservation programmes point to larger, structural issues that confound the 
process. What are these issues and are conservation INGOs the best organizations to lead 




Besides detailing the methodological issues that I faced during this project, I also would like 
to address my experiences in KNP. Throughout this project, I felt great discomfort as an 
outsider coming to disrupt the activities of fishermen to glean information for this 
dissertation.  
As Sanders observes, 
Field research… requires people to carry out tasks which run against the grain of 
earlier socialization and social experience. Thus, it is difficult to avoid the fear of 
being a stranger, the fear of rejection when seeking personal details about people’s 
lives and the fear of violating the normative standards of those being studied (Sanders 
1980 in Lee 1993: 121). 
 
 During the course of this project, I saw how my position as a researcher affected 
respondents’ interactions with me, through their previous experiences, expectations and 
perceptions of researchers.  
Fieldwork was carried out over five months in March to April 2003, September to 
October 2003 and again in March 2005. Primary research was in the form of participant 
observation and unstructured interviews due to the sensitivity of the subject. As much of the 
literature and media featured TNC management and other prominent community leaders/ 
NGOs, I sought to determine if the situation painted in the media reflected the realities of 
villagers living in and around the park. The subject of TNC management in KNP was 
considered sensitive as such alliances were rumoured to entail economic gain and perceived 
resistance was thought to involve some sort of sanction or economic loss. More importantly, 
the uncertainty of TNC’s role in the park’s future was a major disincentive for people to 
speak out (in the event that TNC might have greater say in park regulations that might curtail 
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village livelihoods). There was suspicion that TNC had its ‘people’ in certain villages, well 
placed to report dissent. For example, TNC had purportedly co-opted certain villagers who 
had benefited from tourism in the park as ‘model villagers’ to represent TNC’s efforts in the 
park to visiting officials and other important visitors (Borchers 2002: 48). Direct questioning 
would reveal or be perceived to reveal political alignments of respondents; political in the 
widest sense to refer to the vested interests of powerful persons or institutions, or exercise of 
coercion or domination (Lee 1993: 4). 
People were very reluctant to make their views of TNC known to me, an outsider 
with possible hidden agendas. Early attempts at direct questioning led to non-committal and 
evasive answers as well as suspicion on the part of respondents on my true intentions. I did 
not declare my status as a graduate student interested in the TNC- community conflict 
initially as I thought covert research would avoid the problems of reactivity (Lee 1993: 193). 
However, I realised that views about TNC were mostly couched in rumour, following pro-
TNC or by anti-TNC storylines, and did not reveal any particular information about 
livelihood situations or community interactions with TNC. I began to realise that as a 
newcomer such information would not be easily available to me.  
Fieldwork experience was extremely isolating as data collection proved difficult as 
respondents were unsure of my purpose in KNP and I lacked access to a reliable gatekeeper. 
Ironically, my ‘access career’ (Lee 1993: 122) was started by an acquaintance from a TNC 
staff member who was keen to present a holistic picture of TNC- community relations. 
Access was a constant renegotiation process, where my presence was at times clearly only 
tolerated. As one respondent observed, “ you have stayed more than two weeks here, 
therefore you cannot just be a tourist!” Interviewing effects were a serious consideration due 
to my social position as a non-local, female, graduate student (or perceived position as TNC 
employee or reporter) as well as the initial pressure to obtain data directly pertaining to TNC- 
community interactions (due to its dearth and my limited time in the field), which also shaped 
my expectations of the interview itself (Lee 1993: 99). 
Methodologically, I realised semi structured interviewing and probing unconsciously 
tended to echo my assumptions about the situation in TNC. As fieldwork progressed, I found 
that focussing on TNC might be myopic as TNC played only a marginal role in the actual day 
to day lives of respondents. By repositioning myself as a graduate student interested in 
learning about the social and cultural history of the park and its inhabitants, respondents were 
much more willing to share their views with me and this in turn enabled me to better 
understand community dynamics.  
In view of this, I decided to use a grounded theory approach. A grounded theory 
approach “explores and examine research participants’ concerns and then further develops 
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questions around those concerns, subsequently seeking participants whose experiences speak 
to these questions. Grounded theory methods keep researchers to their gathered data rather 
than to what they may have previously assumed or wished was the case” (Chamaz 2002:148). 
Data was collected using participant observation and informal interviewing, mainly in the 
form of guided conversations. I found that informal interviewing with less structure and 
control, helped to build rapport and uncover new areas of interest (Bernard 2006: 211). With 
subsequent interviews, trust was built with certain respondents, enabling them to feel 
comfortable enough to share their insights into the TNC situation or introduce other 
respondents who might be able to help in my research. 
Secondary sources of information in the form of newspaper articles, reports and 




In the following chapters, I will trace the historical emergence about concepts such as 
‘nature’, ‘participation’ and how they inform present debates about conservation. In 
particular, the persistence of the wilderness preservation tradition that informs current 
conservation practice. I attempt to show how this failure of large scale conservation 
programmes is predicated on a neglect of the unique social political contexts that face each 
conservation site.  
 In Chapter three, I will also examine the Indonesian political context that has shaped 
environmental policy, in particular the impact of Suharto’s New Order regime and the 
subsequent transition to decentralization on the position of local and international NGOs. I 
also introduce some background to TNC and its partnership with the PHPA in the 
management of Komodo National Park. Chapter 4 explores the reaction to TNC’s 25 year 
Management Plan and its implications for local communities. I also look at how the 
simmering resentment becomes a backlash of anger when two fishermen are shot dead in the 
park in 2002. As will be shown in chapter 5, the shooting became a symbol for many things 
that were wrong with TNC’s management and the use of storylines, in particular, that of bio-
centrism and human rights violations, were actively used by INGOs and other local NGOs as 
rallying points to mobilize opposition against TNC on a regional and national level.  
However, these campaigns have made little impact on the daily lives of park residents as 
storylines are also hijacked by actors for personal and political gains and little has been done 
to improve their position in KNP. In chapter 6, I conclude that conservation efforts in KNP 
will continue to fail as competing storylines obscure the actual issues that compromise the 
livelihoods of KNP residents. 
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In this chapter I will trace the historical emergence of what I am calling ‘story lines’ about 
‘nature’ and ‘participation’ as they intersect in concerns about conservation. These ‘story 
lines’ must be unravelled historically in order to make it clear how ideas of nature have been 
constructed and how these particular ideas have come to inform ‘conservation’ strategies that 
are being applied globally in the contemporary world. In recent decades concerns about unjust 
conservation have lead to about ideas about local community participation. But what is 
community and what is participation? These also are ideas that are not straightforward, and 
have been the source of contestation, particularly as they intersect with notions of 
‘conservation’. Hence, as we will see, national parks have come under close scrutiny in the 
last few decades, due to the multitude of actors and institutions that have come to be 
encompassed in the national park process. However, the use of national parks as a 
conservation tool is informed by various ideologies, and it is this aspect that is worthy of 
investigation. Though research on national parks is diverse and wide-ranging, research on 
social processes of national parks have generally followed several themes such as social 
justice (concerning the loss of rights of people living in protected areas), eco tourism, gender 
issues and political economy. Less attention has been paid to how national park issues have 
been absorbed into larger discourses resulting in their rising or decreasing prominence in 
national and international discourses.  
 
What is “Nature”? 
 
“[T]he environment is as much constructed as it is discovered, catalogued, identified, and 
classified. Environmental truths are made rather than found. We see the environment as less 
of a backdrop to social action and more as a narrative whose meaning is changing, unstable 
and subject to contestation, negotiation, and conflict…(Benton & Short 1999: 3,4)” 
 
The formation and justification of national parks is intricately linked to the production of 
nature as a discourse, its perceived function and role in human society. National parks, in 
particular, are good examples of how human beings struggle to define, control and manage 
the discourse of nature. National parks are not just spatial boundaries that define where nature 
begins and civilization should end, they are also boundaries of action and practice where each 
space is governed by separate ideals and rules.  
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The problem with national parks is that historically they are a Western/European 
product that has changed little in form in the last 200 years. National parks are a unique 
cultural product that has represented a specific spatial relationship between people and nature. 
Their form and function are contingent on the use of exclusionary categories that separate 
human society from nature. This particular articulation of nature, the dichotomy between the 
urban and rural, has had profound effects on the shaping of environmental discourse and the 
physical landscape. Vandergeest and Du Puis (1996) trace the transformation of European 
perceptions towards nature as being treacherous, distant and dangerous to an object of a 
nature mythology, that is nature as Eden or utopia, explicitly as a critique of industrialization 
by poets and artists of the Romantic era. Additionally early theorists identified faraway places 
in the non-Western world with an unchanging nature and tradition, and later anthropologists 
came to represent native societies as people without time and history. Thus, Nature was 
placed along a continuum where ‘modernity’ is in the present and ‘rurality’ in the past. In this 
respect nature became associated with timelessness (Wolf 1982 in Vandergeest and Du Puis 
1996). In this way nature became separated both spatially and temporally from secular human 
activity in ‘modern’ society.  
National parks and protected areas are to a large extent the product of the changing 
relations between people and their environment in North America during the early nineteenth 
century and the legacy of the actions and ideals of North Americans such as Gifford Pinchot 
and John Muir. Though the idea of restricted wilderness areas is not new-- the Moguls in 
Assyria had restricted large spans of wilderness for royal hunts as early as 700BC, as did the 
Normans in 11AD (Westoby, 1987 in Colchester 1997: 100)—the underpinnings of the North 
American national park system went beyond excluding locals from wilderness areas for the 
pleasure of elites, it laid the foundations of new ideology/ies of how nature could be 
perceived, used and ‘managed’. Boyd and Butler (2000) detail how the importance of the 
images of wilderness in art and literature shaped early perspectives of wilderness and the 
environment in the formation of national parks. In particular, rapid industrialization brought 
about material and social changes, shifting perceptions of nature as primitive, uncivilized and 
frightening, to one that was exotic, fascinating and inspiring, as opposed to the routine and 
monotonous demands of city life (Smith 2001: 118). They also single out factors such as the 
need for recreational space, in the face of rapid urbanization, and the perceived economic 
benefits of tourism that affluent European and American tourists would bring with the 
extension of the railroad (Boyd and Butler 2000: 14-15). Changing ideas of nature in North 
America were associated with not only rapid industrialization and economic growth, but also 
as a form of cultural expression.  
 13 
Individuals such as John Muir, together with the Sierra Club, lead the charge of the 
‘Wilderness Preservation tradition’, which was concerned with conserving nature ‘for its own 
sake’, articulating their vision in predominantly religious and aesthetic terms. Muir’s notion 
of ‘wilderness’ as completely uninhabited has come to play an ever more important role in 
conservation ideology. The creation of National Parks in the USA because of the vision of 
men like Muir, is often traced to Yellowstone National Park (created in 1872), referred to as 
the model for all other National Parks in the world, which have been created in other 
countries since.  When Yellowstone was established, parks and reserves were seen as places 
to be kept pristine and people if they were living there (as was the case with the Shoshone 
Indians in Yellowstone) had to be evicted. National parks originated according to a logic of 
exclusion (Clad 1988, p. 324), except of visitors, that is tourists.  
Smith draws upon the work of John Urry to illustrate the power of tourism and its 
gaze in shaping the consumption of nature, the pivotal aspect of the tourist gaze is the 
dichotomy drawn between the ordinary and extraordinary (Urry 1990: 188).  The power of 
the gaze stems from the visual consumption of the environment (referred to as 
“environmental consciousness”), how the environment is ‘read, how it is appropriated, and 
how it is exploited (ibid: 183). The means and ability of the urban upper classes, and later the 
middle classes, to travel between the urban and rural environments, enabled them to gaze 
upon more environments, focusing their gaze selectively on the idealized differences between 
city life and country life. With the shift from the relations of production to one of 
consumption concerned with aesthetics, the widespread development of the ‘romantic tourist 
gaze’ was accelerated. According to Urry, the romantic tourist gaze thus feeds into and 
supports attempts to protect the environment (ibid: 191). This gaze polarising human society 
from nature consequently transformed attitudes towards nature and consequently justifying 
the means of its protection. 
 
“When nature is understood in this way, it becomes extremely important to save it, and 
almost any means can be justified. Moreover, because nature is not dynamic and changing, 
but a timeless heritage, it must be preserved without change for future generations, often in 
strictly delimited territories. In the hands of the government, this vision has produced the 
national park: land claimed by the government with the justification that it is defending nature 
against human encroachment (Vandergeest and Du Puis 1996: 14-15).” 
 
Whilst romanticism led to the establishment of a preservationist tradition, materialist 
concerns led to a different but compatible emphasis on the conservation and management of 
natural resources (Smith 2001: 121). Unfettered industrialization and the rapid consumption 
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of natural resources caused concern in certain quarters that the degradation of these resources, 
in particular forest resources, would compromise future economic growth. These concerns 
formed the basis of what Rodman terms the ‘Resource Conservation’ movement.  
 
“ The original thrust of the Resource Conservation movement was to enlarge in space and 
time the class of beings whose good ought to be taken into account by decision-makers, and 
to draw from that some conclusions about appropriate limits on human conduct… In 
retrospect, the Resource Conservation standpoint appears to have been an early ideological 
adaptation on the part of a society that was still in the pioneering or colonizing stage of 
succession but had begun to get glimpses of natural limits that would require different norms 
of conduct for the society to become sustainable at a steady-state level (Rodman, 1983 in 
Sessions 1995: 123).” 
 
The precursor to the modern day paradigm of Sustainable Development, the Resource 
Conservation movement laid the foundations for several concepts. Firstly, centralization of 
management and the marginalization of local knowledge through the use of scientific 
methods of mapping and measurement; secondly, the utilitarian assumption that maximizing 
the total sum of benefits should take precedence over local claims to resources. This tenet, in 
particular, has been effectively tied to centralized, production-based management, as well as 
shifts toward higher levels of political control. In addition to increasing commodity 
production, it has helped to bring about a radical shift in land tenure regimes and political 
authority, thereby disrupting and diminishing local subsistence practices all over the world 
(Smith 1997: 118). 
A direct response to the romanticism of the Wilderness Protection Movement was the 
‘fortress conservation’ model consisting of strictly enforced protected areas. On the other 
hand, the Resource Conservation movement turned to science for its solutions, putting the 
management of protected areas in the hands of scientists and administrators, effectively 
deepening state control over agriculture and land based economic activities. This paradigm of 
nature conservation had wider ramifications as it also informed colonial policy in other parts 
of the world, such as South Africa, where colonial political ideology legitimized the 
restriction of peasant farmers to marginal lands, triggering major social changes (see Buscher 
and Wolmer 2007: 4-5). 
The defining characteristic of the modern approach to nature preservation is the 
drawing of strict boundaries across diverse groups of people in space and the use of technical 
knowledge to coercively reshape landscapes to mirror these boundaries (Vandergeest and 
Dupuis 1996: 4). In the process, other cultural categories and local histories are subsumed and 
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ignored to serve external interests. Drawing from world systems and dependency theories, 
Vandergeest and Dupuis show how the ahistorical assumptions underlying a “modernization 
approach”, which is behind the formation of national parks, where ‘nature’ is set apart from 
the ‘modern’, have not just enabled institutions in the core and in cities (such as state agencies 
and multi-national companies) to define and shape the rural periphery, but have also 
influenced “the way that people think, speak, and write about the country” (ibid: 6).   
 Vandergeest and Du Puis also draw attention to the spatial and social gulf that 
separate local inhabitants from outsiders such as state agencies, activists and intellectuals, that 
attempt to represent them.  Inhabitants often have differing aspirations, perspectives and 
agendas from outsiders. However, their wishes and positions are often ignored in the face of 
differing interests and agendas of the outsider who is politically and economically stronger. 
The obsession with the protection and management of specific places, predominantly by 
urban centres of power, further simplifies global environmental problems, and focuses on the 
production of pristine uninhabited images of nature to be protected, shifting attention away 
from the problems created by developed countries through their rapacious consumption of 
global resources. Hence this discourse of separation privileges political and economic 
interests of those living in urban centres, silencing inhabitants who inhabit national parks, 
often located in peripheral areas (Vandergeest and Dupuis 1996: 8).  
Sanctioned under scientific authority and governed by global interests, the number of 
protected areas continues to grow. According to the World Commission on Protected Areas, 
there are some 30 000 protected areas, covering 12.8 million square kilometers, equivalent to 
9.5% of the earth’s terrestrial area (IUCN 2000: 2).  The number of protected areas is poised 
to increase in size and number- trans-frontier conservation areas and corridors, networks of 
protected areas across national boundaries, are now not only expected to fulfil development 
and conservation goals, but those of peace and ‘international understanding’ (in Wolmer and 
Buscher 2007:11). Protected areas remain integral to the conservation storyline and in the 
next section, I will attempt to unravel the historical persistence of protected areas as an 




The 1970s marked the beginning of the aggressive politicization of environmental issues on 
an international level. The environment became an additional item on the development 
agenda, as failures in the modernization paradigm were understood to be detrimental to both 
people and the environment (Sachs 1999: 34).  In 1972, the Club of Rome published Limits to 
Growth, highlighting the possible input limits to further industrial development. 
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Industrialization had resulted in a wealthy elite, whilst the majority of third world populations 
were no better off than they had been prior to the start of the development project. The 
development world now switched from the use of ‘economic growth’ as an indicator of 
success, to the concept of fulfilling ‘basic needs’.  As some of the world’s poorest were living 
in environmentally fragile areas, the new development object was irretrievably linked to the 
environment. 
 In the same year, the UN held its first conference on the Human Environment. This 
conference focused on natural resources management, as well as on the environmental side 
effects of industrialization such as air pollution and acid rain, as both resource depletion and 
pollution were seen as potentially jeopardizing development (Chatterjee and Finger 1994:7). 
Other events such as the oil crisis, made governments aware that continued growth depended 
on not just capital formation or skilled manpower, but also on the long term availability of 
natural resources. “ Foods for the insatiable growth machine—oil, timber, minerals, soils, 
genetic material—seemed on the decline and concern grew about the prospects of long-term 
growth. This was a decisive change in perspective: not the health of nature but the continuous 
health of development became the centre of concern” (Sachs 1999: 34). A reformulation of 
the development strategy, incorporating the developing world and its environment (and its 
problems), was urgently needed.  
 Story-lines about conservation emerged at this specific economic, social and political 
juncture in the 1970s, heralding the age of what Hajer calls ‘ecological modernization’ (Hajer 
1995: 26-27). Ecological modernization represented a new policy oriented discourse in 
environmental politics. Prior to this, environmental politics was considered secondary to 
industrial politics, concerned with pollution clean up and abatement legislation by separate 
bureaucratic structures. Many western countries set up organizational structures such as 
ministries (to police the air, water, soil) to compartmentalize the task of managing the 
environment.  
Ecological modernization changed the dynamic of environmental politics by bridging 
this gap in policy in several ways. Firstly, ecological modernization recognized the structural 
nature of the environmental problematique but also assumed that political, economic, and 
social institutions could internalize the care for the environment. Secondly, ecological 
modernization framed environmental problems in monetary units combined with discursive 
elements derived from the natural sciences, making environmental damage calculable and 
measurable. Thirdly, environmental problems were seen as a management problem, a result 
of a lack of collective action, with no real obstacles to resolution in an environmentally sound 
society. Finally, ecological modernization assumed that economic growth and resolution of 
environmental problems can be reconciled (Hajer 1995: 25-26).  The strength of ecological 
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modernization rhetoric lies in its positive approach to environmental policy, using the 
language of business, conceptualizing environmental pollution as a matter of inefficiency, 
whilst operating within the boundaries of cost-effectiveness and administrative efficiency. It 
does not address social contradictions inherent in the discourse nor does it call for any 
structural change, creating more business opportunities and a market for waste abatement 
technology (ibid).  
Along this vein, the World Conservation Strategy of 1980, and later the Brundtland 
Report on Sustainable Development both re-worked the notion of growth and environmental 
degradation, focusing on ‘sustainable’ utilization of species and ecosystems, making 
technological progress the solution to overcoming the obstacle of environmental degradation 
to growth. Nature could now be constructed, ordered and administered by bureaucracies of 
the modern nation states, scientists and corporations. By imposing corporate administrative 
frameworks on Nature to meet the demands of the national or international economy, 
“[n]ature is reduced to a system of systems that can be dismantled, redesigned, and assembled 
anew to produce its many “resources” efficiently and in adequate amounts when and where 
needed in the modern marketplace” (Luke 1995: 79). Such “Resource Managerialism” further 
entrenches the position of the nation state as it becomes the conduit for the exploitation and 
management of resources, subjecting more natural resources to centralized state conservation 
programmes (ibid: 78-79). 
Subsequent international interventions to improve global environmental health have 
resulted in the development of networks and production of new sites of knowledge between 
developed countries, their scientific communities and corporate interests. In particular, the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), one of the key agreements signed during the Rio 
Earth Summit in 1992, has continued to be the driving force in the push to create more 
protected areas. Three main goals were established in the agreement- the conservation of 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits from the use of genetic resources.1 With the creation of the Global 
Environment Facility (see next chapter), a financial mechanism to administer biodiversity 
projects, biodiversity protection became the new storyline to justify even larger, more 
ambitious protected area projects.  
 
Biodiversity storylines and networks 
 
                                                 
1 For the text on the Convention on Biological Diversity, see 
<http://www.cbd.int/convention/guide.shtml> , last accessed 24/11/07. 
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Together with the publication of the Global Biodiversity Strategy, published jointly by the 
World Resources Institute (WRI), International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the CBD can be 
identified as the textual origins of the emergence of biodiversity in conservation discourse 
(Escobar 1996: 54). Though derived from concrete biophysical parameters, Escobar contends 
that biodiversity does not exist in an absolute sense but is a recent discursive invention. 
Biodiversity is seen as a response to the problematization of survival, precipitated by the loss 
of biodiversity (ibid: 55).  
 
Analysed as a series of networks, biodiversity can be understood as  
 
…chains of sites characterized by a set of heterogeneous parameters, practices and 
actors. Each actor’s identity is affected by and affects, the network. Intervention in 
the network is done by means of models (e.g., of ecosystems, conservation 
strategies); theories (e.g., of development, restoration); objects (from plants and genes 
to various technologies); actors (prospectors, taxonomists, planners and experts); 
strategies (resource management, intellectual property rights); etc. These 
interventions effect and motivate translations, transfers, travels, mediations, 
appropriations and subversions throughout the network (ibid: 55). 
 
The development of these biodiversity production networks and the consequent growth of 
vast institutional apparatuses that regulate the production of knowledge and power through 
strategies and programmes, linking international organizations, NGOs, universities, botanic 
governments, research institutes in both first and third worlds to a multitude of experts 
located in dominant sites in the network (ibid: 56). “According to actor-network theory, the 
biodiversity narrative created obligatory passage points for the construction of particular 
discourses. This process translates the complexity of the world into simple narratives of 
threats and possible solutions. The aim was to create a stable network for the movement of 
objects, resources knowledge and materials (ibid: 56).” 
 
 As storylines and biodiversity are formulated and articulated in dominant sites in the 
network, local contexts and priorities take a back seat in the creation of protected areas in the 
name of biodiversity as they do not resonate within the dominant discourse. Developing 
countries often occupy a marginal position in negotiations, due to the political economy of 
debt in developing countries. As the GEF is administered under the auspices of the World 
Bank, developing countries are also pressured into implementing environmental and 
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conservation policies, under the threat of termination of World Bank/ International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) bridging of adjustment and project loans (Taylor and Buttel  2006: 414). 
Another important site in biodiversity discourse production networks is International 
NGOs, as they are a major channel of biodiversity funding from the developed world to the 
developing world. INGOs emerged as important conduits of aid for official development and 
humanitarian assistance in the 1980s. This role expanded in the 1990s, where official aid 
flows declined overall, and both directly (bilateral and multilateral) and indirectly via INGOs. 
In 1990, official grants to INGOs fell from 2.4billion US dollars in 1988 to 1.7 billion US 
dollars in 1999. Private donations, including individual, foundation and corporate 
contributions, increased from 4.5 to 10.7 billion US dollars, underscoring the significant 
expansion of INGOs in the 1990s (Anheier and Cho 2005: 4). 
  A paradigm shift in global civil society played a part in the growing visibility of 
INGOs in the development field. By analyzing the various manifestations of global civil 
society, Anheier and Cho offer insight into the trends in INGO function and formation 
(Anheier and Cho 2005). Most notably, the new public management expression, which is 
replacing conventional development assistant policies; an approach which is driven by the 
inadequacy of the state in the management of its welfare, development and environmental 
problems, and the view that INGOs are better equipped and more efficient in handling service 
provision. INGOs take on the role of a sub-contractor, as an instrument of privatization for 
national and international welfare state reform (ibid: 7). There is also the growing trend of 
corporatization and professionalization of NGOs, as an increasing number of business 
partnerships are made, encouraged by the resource-poor international community, as well as 
meeting western consumers’ demands for social responsibility (ibid: 7-8).  
 This has serious implications for local communities who come under the management 
of such ‘sub-contractors’ as INGO interests are often located within the dominant discourse. 
One example of the production of knowledge within the network can be seen in Juanita 
Sundberg’s study of the creation, interaction and shaping of competing discourses --“the 
conservation encounter” (Sundberg 2003: 53)—between INGOs, the local communities and 
the polity in the Maya Biosphere. She traces the ways NGOs construct and impose a moral 
authority using biodiversity discourse by claiming that science is a ‘truth’ and a value free 
reality that should be used to define and order ‘appropriate’ ways of life for the Biosphere’s 
inhabitant (Sundberg 2003: 64). As INGOs are ultimately accountable to donors or donor 
nations in the developed world, local priorities are often subsumed under such international 
conservation storylines, contributing to the shortcomings and failures of conservation 
programmes that will be outlined in the following section. 
 
 20 
Why and When does conservation fail? 
 
The failure of large-scale conservation programmes in Southeast Asia (and indeed the 
developing world) is increasingly common. A number of problems then can be identified as 
to the reasons why there has been so much difficulty implementing successful conservation 
programs. The highly politicized relationship over natural resources and biodiversity 
conservation discourses is highlighted by Piers Blaikie and Sally Jeanrenaud (1997), who 
show how there has been an evolution of conservation discourse from the early approach of 
‘nature preservation’ where there was little regard for human welfare and resistance from 
local populations were dealt with through coercion. The classical approach to conservation 
was problematic as it imposed romanticized, Arcadian notions of nature from affluent 
cultures upon foreign peoples and environments (Blaikie and Jearnrenaud 1997: 60-64). More 
often than not, elitist interests have been instrumental in the establishment of national parks, 
often as playgrounds for the rich, in which local people’s statuses were changed to those of 
trespassers, poachers and squatters (ibid: 62). The recognition that this approach was a failure 
lead to the emergence of a ‘neo-populist’ or people-oriented approach. Participatory projects 
such as Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), as well as joint-
management projects, were aimed at involving the politically marginalized majority. This was 
to be achieved through the setting of agendas through dialogue, adapting plans to local 
conditions, and facilitating conservation through participatory action and enabling policies at 
international, national and local levels (ibid: 64).  
 However, participatory approaches, where projects invoke words like ‘participation’ 
and ‘community’ to sanitize environmental projects need to be closely examined. A 
distinction commonly made is participation as a means (to accomplish a project) or 
participation as an end (where the community or group sets up a process to control its own 
development).  The label ‘community participation’ may help legitimize development 
projects, used for instrumental, rather than transformative purposes and may be confined to 
the levels of information sharing and consultation, rather than joint decision-making or 
initiation and control by ‘stakeholders’ (Mc Gee 2002: 105). 
First launched by the World Wildlife Fund in 1985 as its ‘Wildlands and Human 
Needs Programme’, Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) now number 
approximately 300 world wide, absorbing the majority of international conservation funding 
(Hughes and Flintan 2001: 4-5). The fundamental premise of ICDPs is that as communities 
‘develop’, their dependency on natural resources will decline. In this way, however, local 
people are also assumed to be the primary threat to natural resources in protected areas. 
However, recent literature suggests that “development tools to achieve conservation 
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objectives- was neither understood by implementing counterparts in national and provincial 
government, nor sufficiently integral to ICDP design and practice (ibid: 6).”  
ICDP design is closely linked to prevailing development paradigms. As a product of 
earlier failures of the modernization development paradigm that in turn determined classical 
conservation approaches of protected areas, ICDPs are closely linked in particular to 
Sustainable Development approaches that are popular in environmental policy. The 
imposition of the environmental agenda by developed world policy makers also reflects a 
chasm in understanding of peoples in developing countries. From a political economy 
perspective, core understandings of the environment are persistently being imposed on 
countries in the periphery, despite their lack of relevance and applicability in a third world 
context. The imposition of foreign paradigms of nature and exclusion, have been shown to be 
a major thread in the globalization of a conservation ‘story line’. What that paradigm has 
done, in several different guises, is marginalize the inhabitants of places that are being 
‘conserved’. This ignores the fact that these places have in fact never been ‘pristine’, and 
have evolved in conjunction with human use.  
Programs that attempt to elicit ‘community participation’, however, have had their 
own problems. One of these is what the meaning of ‘participation’ is supposed to be in 
regards to communities. As Pretty and Vodohuhe have shown, participation ranges along a 
continuum from passive participation to self mobilization (Pretty & Vodohuhe 1997). At one 
extreme is the top-down approach, while at the other end the community has full autonomy. 
In the middle are the participatory and co-management approaches. However communities 
themselves are also not homogenous units, and members do not all have the same interests 
and goals. Communities are constantly changing; Carlsson and Berkes (2005) call them 
multidimensional, cross-scale political units with unpredictable behaviour. Although this fact 
is a common theme in much of the literature on co-management, there is still not sufficient 
attention paid to local and community politics (Mahanty and Russel, 2002). In a recent paper 
Moeliono (2005) has shown how complex the issue of ‘participation’ has in fact been in 
Indonesian conservation agendas; often because of the legal emphasis on participation drafted 
by the Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia, local communities are expected to ‘participate’, but 
there is in fact no clear benefits for them for doing so. Their legal rights to the land have been 
taken away, but they are held responsible for ‘participating’ in the protection of the lands 
against outside incursion. This perhaps is the most ironically unjust twist in the ‘participation’ 
paradigm. As will be seen, this is indeed part of the ‘story line’ that is present in the Komodo 




The case of Komodo National Park 
 
The Komodo National Park is one such conservation project where a multitude of interests 
collide and jockey for resources and power. The high profile shooting of unarmed fishermen 
in November 2002 catapulted the park into the national media spotlight. At the centre of the 
storm was an American NGO, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), that had funded the patrol 
boats in the park for their introduction of draconian conservation measures that limited park 
access and curtailed fishing activity in KNP, new measures which were seen as indirectly 
leading to the shooting. 
 In 1995, TNC had entered into a partnership with the Indonesian Department of 
Forestry and Conservation (Perlindungan Hutan dan Pelastrian Alam/ PHPA) to manage 
KNP for 25 years. TNC’s subsequent partnership with a Malaysian businessman in this 
collaboration was subject to great local scrutiny, as TNC’s larger objectives seemed to be 
commercial, and the lack of transparency in the partnership and subsequent programmes 
suggested that this collaboration was far from altruistic. TNC’s large budgets and ambitious 
projects, also suggested that the local park authority was being manipulated to ratify laws and 
accomplish the goals pre-determined by TNC. 
TNC is the richest not-for-profit conservation body in the United States. Its funds are 
largely obtained through membership fees from a member base of more than one million in 
the US.2 TNC also receives substantial contributions from major corporations, foundations as 
well as wealthy individuals. Traditionally, TNC’s approach to conservation has been to buy 
up parcels of land which have been assessed by its scientists to have substantial ecological 
value. By preserving large tracts of land and protecting them from urban development, TNC 
hopes to protect native animal and plant species from extinction. TNC also sells these parcels 
of land to private developers, on the condition that the proposed land use is compatible with 
conservation objectives.3 
 The work of TNC is largely preservationist in nature—they seek to preserve the 
‘original’ wilderness of an area. Luke has critically assessed the TNC approach to ‘preserving 
the world’s last great places’, by suggesting that these ‘last great places’ are like cemeteries, 
graveyards for nature (1997). Is the assumption behind this stand that, in the rest of the world 
nature is dead and that their job is to preserve those few remaining places? This view allows 
to go un-criticized the abuse of the natural world by big businesses (which sponsor TNC), but 
instead targets local communities in the vicinity of these ‘great places’, who end up carrying 
                                                 
2 TNC website, < http://www.nature.org/aboutus/> 
3 See http://www.nature.org/aboutus/howwework/conservationmethods/privatelands/ 
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the burden of responsibility and loss, because these places have become ‘preserved’. As will 
be discussed in the next chapter, environmental protection in Indonesia has been full of the 




This chapter has attempted to show that ‘conservation’ has developed into a ‘story line’ that 
has multiple different meanings. Different people can mean different things by it, that can 
often end up being contradictory. The two main contestations within the ‘story line’ of 
conservation, that has implications for national parks in Indonesia, and the Komodo National 
Park in particular, are what I have shown to have historically been there from the beginning; 
the concern with preserving a ‘pristine’ nature (as outlined by Muir and the wilderness 
preservation tradition), and the idea of nature as a ‘resource’ that should be conserved for 
exploitation. These two views in the contemporary world can best be illustrated by the 
‘biosphere reserve model’, advocated by TNC, where certain zones of nature must be strictly 
cordoned off and excluded from use, versus the sustainable use model, where people should 
be allowed to live in protected areas, but use them carefully and sustainably. 
 The contradictions and tensions in these two different views of conservation can be 
seen to come to a head when the question of ‘participation’ of ‘communities’ is raised. 
‘Participation’, and ‘communities’, I argue, are also two words that can be ambiguously 
understood, lending themselves to different interpretations, and thus to being the subject of 
differently understood ‘story lines’. Those who advocate a strict cordoning off of nature, talk 
about participation and community, but have a different understanding of what this means, 
than those who advocate sustainable use.  
 Ultimately it can be seen that globally conservation programs have sought to control 
access to biological resources through the establishment (and enforcement) of exclusionary 
national parks and protected area systems. National parks and protected areas privilege the 
notion of boundaries as exclusive and permanent, denying legitimacy of a pre-existing spatial 
discourse. Like maps discussed by Peluso (2003), which are used as tools of the state and its 
control (see also Andersen 1991), protected areas also become instruments by which state 
agencies draw boundaries and establish the claims enforced by their courts of law, thus 
producing territories (Peluso 2003: 234). As a favoured tool in biodiversity conservation, the 
protected area systems approach attempts to create human-free wilderness in the name of 
environmental protection. However, this narrow conception of what is fundamentally a 
resource allocation problem often ignores the social issues of resource use and pits the 
developed world’s environmental agenda against the daily needs of the developing one. 
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Unsurprisingly, many of such projects have failed, despite generous injections of foreign aid.  
However, as we will see in the next chapters, these programmes have continued in Indonesia, 
despite growing recognition in policy circles that there is a need for a more humanistic 
approach to conservation that espouses participation of local people in all aspects of planning 
and implementation. The ideas of ‘participation’ and ‘community’ however, have been 
differently understood by different parties, and it is argued from some quarters that local 
involvement still remains largely in name, rather than in practice. 
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Chapter 3 Indonesia and Conservation 
 
Introduction: Political Change and Focus on the Environment  
 
Conservation policies in Indonesia need to be understood against the background of foreign 
policy and political alignments in Indonesia over the second half of the twentieth century. 
After Indonesian Independence from the Dutch in 1945, Sukarno had pursued an aggressive 
foreign policy and had fostered close ties with the eastern bloc. These ties were not looked 
upon favourably by western countries, nor various elements in Indonesian society itself. After 
an alleged communist coup attempt was aborted in 1965, Sukarno was deposed and replaced 
by General Suharto in 1965 (Suryadinata 1992: 81). Foreign and domestic policy changed 
radically under Suharto’s “New Order” government, forging an economic orientation that was 
outward looking, authoritarian and ‘virulently anti-communist’ (Anwar 2005: 201). This 
change in policy gained favour with Western governments, led by the United States, since at 
this time, at the height of the Cold War, they were eager to court developing countries that 
were anti-communist. Hence much support was offered to Indonesia, such as economic aid, 
military packages and political support; this ironically legitimized the rule of the authoritarian 
regime of Suharto (ibid: 201). Through legitimizing Suharto’s authoritarian regime, space for 
negotiation and contestation on all levels was quashed, under the rhetoric that economic 
development could only be achieved if there was political stability (ibid: 203). 
 In the 1990s, the environment in Indonesia increasingly became a bargaining chip in 
trade relations between Indonesia and the West. Western countries, feeling the threat from 
rapidly growing economies in ASEAN and Asia, began to pursue a generally protectionist 
trade policy, raising non-trade barriers against goods from developing countries. Western 
labour unions, various NGOs and interest groups, pressured Western governments to link 
these non-trade barriers to labour rights, environmental protection, as well as issues of 
political freedom and human rights in general. Anwar suggests that such non-economic 
conditions have increasingly become criteria for Western aid loans to developing countries 
(ibid: 209). At the same time, the 1990s saw the institutional bases of environmentalism 
multiplying throughout Southeast Asia. The number of environmental NGOs, addressing 
diverse issues, increased rapidly, with strong links to each other, as well as with international 
environmental organizations (Hirsch and Warren 1998: 7). With the advent of large-scale 
multi-lateral funding from the World Bank, Asian Development Band and UN agencies, 
Indonesian NGOs found greater scope to engage in independent organising and policy 
advocacy helping to erode the hegemony of the Indonesian state (Clarke 1998: 41). It was in 
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this period, of the late New Order, that The Nature Conservancy entered into Indonesia, 
initially partnering with an Indonesian NGO to begin surveying the Komodo National Park. 
With the end of the New Order in 1998, and the onset of reformasi (reform) and 
decentralization in 1999, policies towards the environment became rather chaotic. Legislation 
devolved many powers and authorities over various areas to the local regional governments, 
however jurisdiction over protected areas was to remain in the hands of the central 
government, under the Directorate-General of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation 
(Directorat-Jenderal Perlindungan Hutan dan Konservasi Alam/ PHKA) within the Ministry 
of Forestry (Tan 2007). The confusing part of this devolution of power, as Tan points out, is 
that production areas, such as production forests, were to be controlled by the regions, so as to 
foster their fiscal autonomy, but conservation areas were not. Another ambiguity in the law, 
which was only resolved in a 2004 law on fisheries, was that marine protected areas were 
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Forestry, and not under the Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (Patlis 2007). These various ambiguities in the laws and powers that 
were devolved to different institutions, has led, in the era of decentralization  to widespread 
environmental abuse in Indonesia, much of it being instigated by political elites at local, 
regional and national levels (Patlis 2007, Tan 2007). At the same time as exploitation of the 
environment has increased, the concern of international conservation organizations over 
abuse and preservation of the natural environment in Indonesia has also grown. In the era of 
regional autonomy and decentralization, these organizations have been put in the situation of 
having to negotiate with multiple levels of government in order to gain access to protected 
areas. In the next section I look more closely at the legislation which has been developed over 
the last several decades in Indonesia to specifically control the environment and create areas 
of protection. 
 
The creation of a protected areas programme in Indonesia 
 
Legislation pertaining to protected areas was first drawn up during the Dutch occupation. 
Subsequently after Indonesian Independence in 1945, the State assumed ownership of all land 
under the 1945 constitution, suppressing traditional (or adat) law and refusing to recognize 
customary ownership of land and resources (Baines and Hendro 2000: 136). Prior to the early 
1980s, legislation pertaining to environmental protection was still under laws created during 
the Dutch colonial period, primarily under the ‘Nuisance Ordinance’ (Hinderordonnantie) of 
1926. One of the first international conservation organizations to be involved in conservation 
efforts in Indonesia was the World Wildlife Fund, who worked together with the Dutch 
government to help maintain wildlife.  They worked together with the Indonesian Directorate 
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of Wildlife Conservation (Direktorat Perlindungan dan Pengawetan Alam/ PPA), until 1980, 
when efforts were made to reduce the amount of foreign influence (Baines and Hendro 
2000:138). During this time, a national survey of conservation needs was made resulting in a 
seminal National Conservation Plan that would guide subsequent biodiversity conservation 
efforts in Indonesia. However, little government support for the PPA meant that efforts 
toward biodiversity conservation were continually frustrated (ibid). 
 The creation of protected areas was in part a response to the need to preserve the 
rapidly vanishing biodiversity of Indonesia that was coming under severe threat due to 
untrammelled resource exploitation, particularly in the forestry sector. Despite earlier 
attempts to reduce donor influence, external pressures from foreign donors, notably the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank had a sizeable influence on the environmental policies in 
Indonesia at the time, due to Indonesia’s heavy dependence on foreign aid for its economic 
programmes (Warren and Elston 1994: 7, 10). Growing international pressure for the creation 
of protected areas also resulted in the third World Parks Congress being held in Bali in 1982.  
The changing political context also had great implications for the increased media 
exposure and public pressure on environmental issues. The Environment Ministry and its 
respected minister at the time, Emil Salim, helped build political pressure to address 
environmental issues, which subsequently influenced greater awareness and action in the 
institutional sphere (Warren and Elston 1994: 10). Salim was the first minister when the 
Ministry of Environment was created in 1978, and was a supporter of environmental NGOs. 
During his tenure, the basis of all present day environmental legislation, Act 4 of 1982, 
“Basic Provisions for the Management of the Living Environment”, was drawn up. Though 
basic, this act of legislation is central to subsequent present day legislation on environmental 
management, providing a legislative framework for enforcement of environmental protection 
(ibid: 8).  
Indirectly through his support, the number of NGOs flourished from 78 in 1978 to an 
estimated 750 during the mid-1990s (Sakai 2002: 171). During his reign as Minister, the 1982 
Environmental Management Law was drafted, officially recognizing for the first time the role 
that NGOs played as agents of development. Despite this law being restricted to the field of 
environmental issues, it recognized the complementary role that NGOs could also play on 
multiple levels, in other fields such as poverty alleviation and education in relation to 
environmental protection and degradation (ibid: 169). 
Come the late 1980s, concerned NGOs, academics and research institutions had 
begun to question government policies and programmes that promoted the unsustainable 
extraction of natural resources. The devolution of environmental management, as well as the 
opening up of spaces for negotiation and contestation, generated much demand for greater 
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accountability for environmental protection from the government. Growing public awareness 
of the economic and social costs of environmental degradation, the rise of a middle class, and 
the connection between environmental questions and other hotly contested political issues 
such as conflicts over land tenure and resources, rights of workers, farmers and indigenous 
minorities, the demand for democratization and greater press freedom all played a part in 
moving the environment to centre stage (Warren and Elston 1994: 7).  
Such awareness also resulted in the strengthening of the environmental movement in 
Indonesia, and the creation of the national forum, Friends of the Earth Indonesia (Wahana 
Linkungan Hidup/WALHI), founded in 1980 and comprising a large number of diverse 
NGOs, committed to both environmental and broader social agendas. The decision of member 
groups to commit WALHI to a higher profile advocacy role at the organisation’s 1992 
conference signalled a concerted move beyond public awareness campaigns and lobbying 
toward judicial activism ( Warren and Elston 1994: 12). The lack of government support for 
PPA’s conservation efforts resulted in lobbying for stricter controls on development using 
environmentally compatible practices, as well as integrated system of protected areas that 
would enable local communities to access resources in a sustainable way. Through sustained 
pressure from civil society, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was eventually brought in to formulate and support 
conservation plans for several protected areas. (Baines and Hendro 2000: 139). 
Indonesia adopted its Biodiversity Action Plan (IBAP) in 1991 and published it in 
1993. The plan focused on protected area and species conservation, but was seen by some as 
being inadequate for protecting other vital biodiversity management needs (Baines and 
Hendro 2000: 131). Its implementation by an authoritarian regime also meant that stakeholder 
commitment, understanding and support was most likely to be limited and inadequate (ibid). 
Subsequent action plans continue to be fraught with difficulties ranging from insufficient 
capacity of implementing agencies, internal disagreement between multiple agencies over 
differing priorities to lack of stakeholder commitment and local participation, as well as 
external contexts of the economic crisis and political upheaval (ibid).  
 
International funding climate 
 
The failures of global conservation programs world wide often follow a similar pattern- large 
capital investment, little regard for local contexts resulting in poorly conceived goals, a lack 
of public participation nor ownership, top down implementation and a failure to address root 
causes of biodiversity loss. The perpetuation of this specific model of programme planning, 
implementation and execution necessitates the analysis of the power relations within INGOs 
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and the donor community. What are the inherent power relationships that have caused the 
acceleration and burgeoning of the conservation/ development NGO ‘industry’? These power 
relations are as important, if not more important, when INGOs start taking over state 
functions of funding, managing and implementing environmental protection in many areas 
(Sundberg in Zimmerer and Bassett 2003: 52, Warren and Elston 1994). Ironically, what 
happens is that the creation and imposition of conservation discourses by INGOs appears to 
be separate, if not entirely oblivious, to individual local contexts. This seemingly wilful 
neglect of local complexities is closely tied to the political economy of global conservation 
funding. These factors combined, I want to suggest, is a major part of the problem of why 
conservation efforts have been failing, and why it can be argued that they have failed in the 
Komodo National Park, despite claims to the contrary. (As will be discussed in chapter 5, 
KNP is one of their great “success” stories). 
 The international funding economy has a large role to play in the chronic 
mismanagement national parks, and of the situation in KNP. Even though the failure of 
conservation programmes world wide have been subject to similar criticisms, be it unrealistic 
objectives such as the continued linkage of environmental and development goals (as noted 
by Hughes and Flintan in the previous chapter) or poor understanding of local contexts (as 
noted by Vandergeest and Dupuis in the previous chapter), a critical dimension that is seldom 
mentioned is the process of how international monies are disbursed and the role of 
International Non-Government Organizations (INGOs) in the procurement of such funds. In 
the following section, I examine how a major environmental fund, the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), actually contributes to the continued creation and implementation of 
unsuitable conservation programmes through its project evaluation process and donor 
obligations, resulting in a preference for large scale projects, short project cycles and 
subsequent failure to resolve root causes of biodiversity loss. 
 
Availability of money 
 
Currently, the Global Environment Facility is the world’s largest source of multilateral 
assistance for the protection of biodiversity (Horta et al 2002). As the financial mechanism 
for the UN convention on biodiversity, GEF has spent more than 7.4 US dollars and 
generated 28 billion US dollars in co-financing, supporting 1950 environmental projects in 
160 countries, concentrating on 4 major areas of concern- ozone depletion, international 
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waters, climate change and biodiversity.4 From 1991 to 2001, biodiversity projects have 
formed the bulk of the GEF investment portfolio (ibid).  
Proposed by the French government in 1989 with an initial commitment of 100 
million US dollars at a World Bank and International Monetary Fund development committee 
meeting, the GEF was to be administered by the World Bank, rather than as an independent 
entity. The establishment of GEF prior to the 1992 Earth Summit would pre-empt any 
alternative proposals for a green fund by Southern governments (Horta 1998). The GEF was 
formally established by a World Bank resolution with a billion dollars initial investment in 
1991. Voting in the GEF was to be based on the size of donor contribution, thus leaving 
southern nations with little or no say in GEF fund allocation (ibid).  
Subsequently, the United Nations Development Plan (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) were invited to form a tri-partite structure with the GEF. In 
this structure, the World Bank, as the overseeing agency, would manage the GEF secretariat, 
GEF investment portfolios and trust fund, while the UNDP would provide technical 
assistance and the UNEP would provide scientific guidance. Later, other UN agencies (such 
as the Food and Agricultural Organization/FAO, UN Industrial Development 
Organization/UNIDO and International Fund for Agricultural Development/ IFAD) and 
development banks (Asian, African, Inter American and European) would come on board as 
GEF executing agencies (Horta et al 2002). 
GEF project ideas are proposed to the UNDP, UNEP or the World Bank who will 
subsequently evaluate their suitability.  Projects must fulfill two criteria; firstly, they must 
reflect national or regional priorities and are supported of the countries involved. Secondly, 
the project must improve the global environment or advance the prospect of reducing risks to 
it. Countries are eligible for funding if they have ratified the relevant treaties pertaining to 
biodiversity and climate change. Countries with economies in transition can borrow from the 
World Bank or receive technical assistance grants from UNDP if they are parties to the 
appropriate treaty.5 
The primary tool of evaluating financial obligations at the GEF is the incremental 
cost principle.  
The reason for developing an approach for estimating incremental cost is that 
incremental cost is pivotal to the operational strategy and financing policy of GEF. 
                                                 
4 GEF website, < http://www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=224&ekmensel=c580fa7b_48_124_btnlink>. 
Last accessed 19/11/2007. 
5 See GEF website for more details on criteria and eligibility for GEF funding 
<http://www.gefweb.org/interior_right.aspx?id=16674> 
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The only financing role for GEF -- in fact its special mandate -- is as the financier of 
agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits 
in the focal areas. It is important to retain this specific focus and not to lose the 
distinction between GEF financing and traditional development assistance. GEF does 
not finance non-incremental costs  (GEF 19966). 
 
In other words, GEF will only finance the cost increment that will achieve global benefits- the 
difference between benefits that will accrue to a given nation and those that will accrue to the 
world at large (Horta et al 2002). The incremental cost tool favours technological, market-
based solutions as they can be more easily quantified. Thus, projects that emphasize low cost 
technology, indigenous knowledge, local stewardship or public education, though meeting the 
criteria of contributing toward ‘global benefits’ do not fit easily into the framework of the 
incremental cost formulae. Additionally, the battle over ‘whose benefits’ are to be funded 
became endemic to the GEF process as debt laden recipient governments needed to meet 
domestic priorities (ibid).  A recent report by the GEF’s Evaluation Committee found the use 
of the incremental cost principle was “confusing, non-transparent and [added] very little to 
project design, documentation and implementation. Of special concern is the fact that 
amongst GEF entities, the understanding of the concept and principles of the incremental cost 
is weak and that diverse views exist” (GEF Secretariat: 20067). 
In a joint report8 by Environmental Defense9 and the Halifax Initiative10 (Horta et al 
2002), the GEF was found to face immense pressure to implement large-scale projects 
quickly to justify financial allocations and satisfy budget cutting parliaments or congresses of 
                                                 
6 Available for download from GEF website 
<http://www.gefweb.org/council/council7/c7inf5.htm#useof>, last accessed 17/11/07. 
7Retrieved from GEF website 
http://www.gefweb.org/Documents/Council_Documents/GEF_30/documents/C.30.ME.3Management
Response_IncrementalCostAssessement.pdf 
8 The complete report is available for download from the Environmental Defense website. 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/2265_First10YearsFinal.pdf. 
9 Environmental Defense is a US based non profit organization and advocacy group that is concerned 
with the protection of environmental rights using market based solutions. See 
http://www.environmentaldefense.org. 
10 The Halifax initiative is a Canadian coalition of development, environment, faith-based, human 
rights groups that is primarily concerned with the transformation of the international financial system 
and its institutions. See http://www.halifaxinitiative.org. 
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donor governments. Consequently, donor agendas often eclipsed the goals of recipient 
countries, leaving little room for community participation.  Short project cycles also meant 
that projects were driven by the implementing agency, whom in turn relied on an international 
community of economic and environmental consultants, rather than local expertise familiar 
with particular government or ecological concerns. Narrow timelines, coupled with “… a 
diplomatic reluctance to pay too much attention to problems and underlying issues” meant 
that little time was left for public consultations, translation and addressing local resistance to 
projects. GEF’s accountability to the World Bank and donor treasuries ultimately undermined 
its goals as it did not challenge the often anti-environmental priorities of its donor 
governments or the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade 
Organization. “[Such] pressures conflict with the need to build local capacity, project 
ownership among and between government officials and local communities, and long term 
support for environmental initiatives through enhanced public participation… results in a 
cookie cutter approach that does not address those needs” (ibid). 
 
GEF and International NGOs 
 
More than 150 GEF-financed projects are executed or co-executed by, or contain contracts or 
subcontracts to, nongovernmental groups.11  The Nature Conservancy is one such group. In 
2001, with the support of the Indonesian government, and a co-financing agreement of 11.6 
million US dollars, TNC managed to secured a GEF grant of 5.375 million US dollars for its 
project “Indonesia: Komodo National Park Collaborative Management”.12  
Increasingly, with greater public interest in biodiversity and conservation, 
international NGOs such as TNC, find themselves in a turf war for biodiversity hotspots to 
not only channel their funding but to also garner additional financial support from major 
international donors. Large INGOs are dependent on their visibility and reputations to canvas 
funds in developed countries. INGOs find themselves competing with each other for large 
grants from international bodies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) and the European Union. Often, major international donors are 
not particularly concerned with the details of projects, but rather that a portion of the funds 
has been allocated towards ‘conservation’ or ‘environmental’ objectives, as green band aids 
to camouflage larger issues such as greenhouse gas emission or fossil fuel development 
(Horta 1998). As seen in the example of the GEF, there is great pressure to spend the money 
                                                 
11 See GEF website for list of accredited NGOs  <http://www.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=114> 
12 As listed on GEF website < http://gefonline.org/projectDetails.cfm?projID=1144>. 
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before donor governments withdraw funds prematurely due to budget cuts or reallocation. 
The close relationship between accredited INGOs and implementing agencies facilitate short 
project cycles as both are subject to accountability of treasuries, auditors and funding cycles. 
The disbursement of large sums to INGOs lightens the administrative burden of implementing 
agencies, shifting the responsibility of allocation and monitoring of funds to these INGOs, 
who in turn will take on the implementation, monitoring and auditing of projects.  
 In this way, large INGOs often are able to garner ample funding because of their 
extensive administrative infrastructure to manage many projects in different countries. Well- 
heeled INGOs such as World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC), with their considerable resources and roots in civil society, lend much credibility to 
conservation programmes. They are thus very important in ensuring the continued injection of 
donor money from both their membership base as well as funding agencies such as GEF. 
INGOs often pick biodiversity areas with  unique species, in particular charismatic 
megafauna, as the  high conservation value are essential in soliciting funding. Their imminent 
extinction creates the necessary urgency to ‘save’ such species (‘donate now!’). However, the 
public must also be able to identify with such species, and thus habitats with charismatic 
megafauna such as tigers, rhinoceroses and Komodo dragons, are preferred conservation 
targets. Invertebrates and reptiles seldom are the focus of large-scale conservation projects 
due to their lack of popular appeal. Marine habitats are gaining increasing visibility because 
of the popularity of SCUBA diving through mass media such as movies like the ‘Little 
Mermaid’ and ‘Finding Nemo’, as well as the growing awareness of declining fish stocks and 
sea pollution in Northern countries. In this way, large scale projects in high biodiversity areas 
are as much a public relations exercise to boost ‘brand’ awareness in the eyes of northern 
policy makers, taxpayers and politicians over accountability to local inhabitants who have to 
live with its consequences.  
 This scrabbling for the rights to work in biodiversity hotspots has conversely created 
an unhealthy climate for conservation. INGOs find themselves ‘paying’ for the rights to work 
in an area, either by remuneration through salaried positions and contracts, incentives (such as 
money for ‘study tours’ and ‘conferences’) or direct pay-outs. According to a conservation 
project manager in Vietnam, such an  ‘investment’ also ensures that a particular INGO has 
monopoly over all conservation projects in the area. Other INGOs hoping to be involved in 
conservation in the same area will have to invest the same amount or more if they want to 
implement any projects in the same area. Thus, bidding for the ‘rights to conserve’ or 
‘conservation concession’ is akin to bidding for any other concessions to access resources in 
the area. It is also rumoured that INGOs such as WWF and TNC are now jostling for the sole 
rights to manage the various biodiversity areas in Indonesia. 
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The Nature Conservancy: Saving the Last Great Places 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), is the richest not-for-
profit conservation body in the United States. Traditionally, TNC’s approach to conservation 
has been to buy up parcels of land which have been assessed by its scientists to have 
substantial ecological value. By preserving large tracts of land and protecting them from 
urban development, TNC hopes to protect native animal and plant species from extinction. 
TNC also sells these parcels of land to private developers, on the condition that the proposed 
land use is compatible with conservation objectives. This became a point of controversy in 
Indonesia, which was used by some local NGOs to try and blacken the name of TNC, as will 
be discussed below. The work of TNC is largely preservationist in nature—they seek to 
preserve the ‘original’ wilderness of an area. As discussed in Chapter 2, wilderness 
preservation first came to the forefront of habitat protection in the late nineteenth century and 
was the impetus for the formation of the first national parks.   
 In 1995 TNC entered into a partnership with the Department of Forestry and 
Conservation (Perlindungan Hutan dan Pelastrian Alam/PHPA) to manage the Komodo 
National Park for 25 years. This was the first of the national parks in Indonesia that TNC has 
become associated with (Halim et al 2007). Since then they have become involved in quite a 
number of other parks in Indonesia such as: Lore Lindu and Wakatobi in Sulawesi, and Raja 
Ampat in Irian Jaya. Their track record in terms of working together well with local people is, 
however, not very good; there have even been moves to chase them out of one of the parks by 
local inhabitants who felt they had no right to restrict their traditional livelihood practices 
(Kompas 30/3/03). As far as I can find out about this original partnership, TNC was invited 
into the Komodo National Park to work together initially with a national NGO. This was at a 
time when the Indonesian government was beginning to come under increasing international 
pressure about biodiversity loss; the park officials at the local level were feeling increasingly 
unable to deal with the management of the park and the protection of species within it. 
Biodiversity loss and diminishing fish stocks are increasingly conceptualized as global 
responsibilities that require supra/ transnational intervention. In 1986, Komodo National Park 
had been declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site (WHS) for the unique terrestrial fauna, 
the Varanus komodensis (Komodo Dragon) found on Pulau Komodo, Rinca and Padar. 
KNP’s designation as a WHS was the first step towards involving the global community in 
environmental politics in Flores, as it signified global recognition of the ‘value’ of the 
Komodo Dragon. This international seal of approval was a key factor in getting TNC 
 35 
involved in the management of KNP. Similarly, TNC benefits from the WHS status that KNP 
brings with it in the raising of funds and publicity for its organization.  
 TNC’s publicity materials often make the case for the protection of the Komodo 
dragon by constructing its habitat as a “last preserve” or “last hope” for the dragons, 
underscoring the urgency in which the donor has to act. The culprit for the decreasing 
numbers of dragons is blamed on human encroachment on its habitat in reducing the number 
of prey species, in particular, deer (Cervus timorensis). The TNC emphasis on ‘preservation’ 
and their focusing on local communities as the source of the deterioration of the natural 
environment, has led to their increasingly being unpopular with many members of the local 
communities, as will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. However many other of 
their management strategies have alienated them in the local context. 
 Firstly almost all of the TNC staff have been non-locals. The first programme 
coordinator of the TNC office in Labuan Bajo in the mid-1990’s was a Manggaraian man, but 
he was replaced subsequently with a Javanese. Rumour in Labuan Bajo has it that the 
Manggaraian was too sympathetic to the local fishermen, and for this reason he was replaced. 
Many of the staff originate from Bali and Java. The question of ‘local’ is important here, 
since from an international perspective any Indonesian is a ‘local’. The present coordinator of 
TNC in Labuan Bajo is very proud of the employment of ‘locals’ in some of their projects, 
but these ‘locals’ are from other parts of Flores. Even though there are one or two ‘local’ 
Manggaraians (people who come from the district of which Komodo National Park is a part) 
who work for TNC, the people in the fishing communities do not recognize them as ‘locals’, 
since no one from the fishing communities themselves has been hired to work in TNC. When 
TNC stepped up its efforts to patrol the park in the late 1990s and early 2000s, they paid a 
number of Labuan Bajo youth an ‘honorarium’ to be involved in guarding the park. These 
were mostly young men who sought work as ‘guides’ in the tourism sector in Labuan Bajo. 
However one resident of Labuan Bajo has complained that no one from the real indigenous 
residents of Labuan Bajo or the neighbouring islands had been chosen by the TNC, but 
instead young men from highland Manggarai or other parts of Flores. Other rumours in 
Labuan Bajo stated that several prominent people who became subsequently the most vocal 
opponents of the TNC had been rejected for jobs with them when they first arrived in Labuan 
Bajo (see Chapter 5). 
 Another matter that has alienated a lot of local residents is the perception of the TNC 
staff as being very highly paid. At times the foreign staff have been resident for periods in 
TNC, and one of them, a Dutch man, had a reputation for flaunting his high pay. He would 
have barbecues party every weekend, where his guests would sit around drinking expensive 
drinks, and eating expensive food that locals could barely afford to have even on rare 
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occasions. These types of lifestyles did not endear the TNC staff to local community 
members.  
 The collaborative management of the Komodo National Park that TNC began to 
promote in 2000, became a further sore point in the eyes of many local people in the vicinity 
of the park. This will be discussed more in chapter 5, however the fact that the “collaborative” 
effort was not one with the local community businesses, but instead with a Malaysian-born 
businessman, made many people from the district of Manggarai, both in Labuan Bajo and the 
islands of the park, as well as ex-patriot Manggaraians living elsewhere, considerably 
agitated. This collaboration was subject to great local scrutiny, as TNC’s larger objectives 
seemed to be commercial, and the lack of transparency in the partnership and subsequent 
programmes and projects suggested that this collaboration was far from altruistic. TNC’s 
large budgets and ambitious projects, also suggested that the local park authority was being 
manipulated to ratify laws and accomplish the goals pre-determined by TNC, rather than the 




Apart from international and national level involvement in conservation efforts in Indonesia, 
there has also been a swelling of local civil society concern with this outside attention. There 
is growing attention on how local communities manage the production of meanings and their 
own understandings of the environment. Local NGO groups have started to defend local 
communities, and contest the labels that are often imposed on them as being un-cooperative 
and ‘uneducated’ about the concepts of ‘conservation’. Because of the involvement of TNC in 
the management of KNP, many local NGOs have emerged to support the goals/rights/ needs 
of the communities in the park. The frequent use of conservation discourse or ‘conservation’s 
new vocabulary’-- international, standardized discourse about eco systems and nature 
protection (see Mc Afee 1999) by TNC has also meant that local NGOs and communities 
have begun to appropriate, reject and transform these discourses to further their own 
objectives and interests. Juanita Sundberg’s research in the Maya Biosphere Reserve in 
Guatemala examined the processes by which the relationship between International NGOs 
and local people can transform landscapes and identities (Sundberg 2003: 51). Sundberg 
examined the role environmental INGOs play in the construction of discourse of 
environmental degradation in the Maya Biosphere Reserve. Through the generation of 
powerful discourses, INGOs had managed to privilege certain ways of thinking, primarily the 
narratives that draw from the sciences as being ‘neutral, unbiased, objective and value free’ to 
marginalize and silence those who did not have access to or familiarity with such discourses. 
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She found that some of the reserve’s inhabitants were able to co-opt such discourses by 
learning to articulate multiple cultural values and practices through their relationships with 
individuals working for such INGOs, as well as other outsiders working in the Reserve who 
were fluent in the discourse. This ability to act as cultural intermediaries was greatly 
dependent on the socio-economic position of the individuals who could engage in these 
discourses to varying degrees of success (ibid: 53). Similarly to what has happened in the 
Komodo National Park,  “the INGOs had no legal authority to enforce laws; rather, their 
authority derives from increasing power of scientific and technological discourse to 
circumscribe how social groups should interact with nature. A host of experts has conducted 
studies of the Peten’s [Maya] biophysical environment, while the most rudimentary 
socioeconomic data are regarded as a sufficient source of knowledge about people’s 
practices” (ibid: 56). 
 In the vicinity of the Komodo National park, there have been several local NGOs 
who became involved with the various communities in the park to oppose TNC and help local 
communities fight for their rights. My first experience of this ‘conservation encounter’ or the 
point of interaction between NGOs and local people (Sundberg 2003: 53) began in Ruteng, 
the capital of the Manggarai Regency, with the NGO, ASPRIDA. ASPRIDA13  was affiliated 
to the Bogor based national environmental NGO TELAPAK (http://www.telapak.org). 
Founded in 1996, ASPRIDA received small grants from other TELAPAK for their work on 
environmental education in Nusa Tenggara Timur. The organization was also concerned with 
the protection and recognition of rights of local communities, as well as providing some 
technical assistance to local communities hoping to manage their own projects. It was after I 
made contact with ASPRIDA, that I met community leaders living in Komodo National Park 
who would openly discuss the conflict. Speaking to Pak HH, village head on Pulau Kukusan, 
it was clear that TNC management plan was not well received, or even well understood by the 
people living in the park. With the increase in environmental legislation that favoured 
protection of the flora and fauna of the park, villagers were often left feeling vulnerable as 
many of their livelihood practices infringed on these news rules and left them open to 
prosecution. This feeling of vulnerability also left many villagers feeling indignant, as these 
rules had been imposed unilaterally and in many ways, impractically. The suggestion that non 
sea-dwelling -“city people”-outsiders should know better than villagers who had lived all 
their lives by the sea for many generations was also a sore point for villagers who felt TNC 
                                                 
13 ASPRIDA’s profile can be found on the “Peace Directory of Indonesia” website: 
http://www.direktori-perdamaian.org/ina/org_detail.php?id=312 
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In this chapter I have tried to provide some background to the political situation in Indonesia 
and globally that has led to various contesting discourses about the use of the environment. 
Under the authoritarian Suharto regime, environmental NGOs were the only ones allowed any 
space for political dissent, albeit very limited, because of the rising international pressure on 
Third World countries about environmental exploitation. This space has opened further in the 
reform era, where local NGOs increasingly struggle in the name of local communities for 
various rights. There has also been increasing international attention on the environmental 
situation in Indonesia, resulting in greater donor reliance for conservation projects and the 
presence of International NGOs, which began under the Suharto regime, intensifying greatly 
in the reform era. This intensified interest has led to a situation of competition between 
NGOs, both between INGOs, with each other over areas that they ‘control’, as well as 
between international NGOs and local NGOs. This competition is expressed quite differently, 
since INGOs concerned with the environment are often ‘preservationist’ in nature, are more 
concerned with the natural environment than with the human inhabitants and are not 
accountable to local governments or national interests. On the other hand the local NGOs, 
speak up for the local inhabitants, both their rights to land and livelihood, as well as their 
indigenous understandings of ‘conservation’ and the environment. What has become 
problematic is a very different understanding of ‘community’, and what their needs are. As 
Sundberg argues for the conflicts in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, INGOs often have a 
superficial understanding of communities. It is to the question of communities that I now turn. 
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One of the recent emphases in the conservation discourse, as I have mentioned 
in chapter 2, is about ‘community participation’. What a community is and who 
constitutes it, has not usually been clearly defined by conservationists, however, 
and there has been recent criticism of this in the social science literature. The 
issue of community in Komodo National Park is a complex and crucial one; not 
only because it determines the implementation and effectiveness of park 
policies, but it also determines the way in which park policies affect the 
dynamics/ identities within the local communities. In the next chapter I will 
explore how the use of labels by TNC homogenizes and discounts the diversity 
of the populations within the KNP.   
One of the complexities of the question of communities in the vicinity 
of the Komodo National Park has to do with the diversity of ethnic groups that 
make up the populations of the town and different villages in the area. Ethnicity 
is only one aspect of understanding community dynamics within KNP, only 
partially salient in determining the parameters that communities are perceived 
and created. The complexity also has to do with the spreading out of the 
population over a number of different islands in and near the park, that are made 
up of villages of mixed ancestry and ethnicity.  
 The islands that I visited that are located in the park are Komodo, Rinca 
and Papagarang. The islands just outside the boundaries of the park that I visited 
are Mesa, Seraya Kecil, Seraya Besar, and Kukusan. These island communities 
are involved in a complex network of relations that are based on economic, 
ethnic and settlement ties. A history of foreign involvement in Western Flores 
has also historically privileged certain ethnic groups over others, depending on 
culturally specific notions of dominance and power that still prevail today.  
 Instead of recognizing the overlapping and cross-cutting ties within and 
between diverse communities in and around the park, the KNP’s management 
plans for the park, have largely ignored this. Instead, communities are 
understood simply as one thing or another, a residential location, by ethnicity or 
in terms of economic position. Such an assessment of community typifies the 
pitfalls that face conservation literature on community-based resource 
management; broadly, the understanding of community as a spatial unit, a social 
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structure and as a set of shared norms. These ideas do little to shed light on the 
causes of these features nor the way these features affect resource utilization 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999: 630). In short, Agrawal and Gibson argue for a 
more political approach that focuses on decision-making processes, in 
particular, the role of institutions and the multiplicity of interests that actors seek 
to protect or advance. In short, “…community based conservation initiatives 
must be founded on images of community that recognize their internal 
differences, processes, their relations with external actors, and the institutions 
that affect both” (ibid). 
 Labuan Bajo is the only town in western Flores. It is where the National 
Park headquarters is located, where TNC is based, and is the capital of the 
newly formed regency of Western Manggarai (Manggarai Barat). Labuan Bajo 
is a small sea side town of approximately 6000 inhabitants. Despite being 
outside the perimeter of Komodo National Park, it is economically most 
significant, as goods and services consumed within the park originate from 
Labuan Bajo. Like most of the communities in the park, it is ethnically diverse; 
and migration over the centuries has brought various groups to its shores, such 
as the Bajo (also spelled Bajau), a nomadic seafaring people located throughout 
eastern Indonesia, the Bugis, a seafaring people from South Sulawesi who have 
also travelled across the archipelago, the Bimanese, from the nearby island of 
Sumbawa, Chinese from other parts of Indonesia as well as from China, and 
more recently people from all over Indonesia, such as Balinese and Javanese. 
Additionally of course in more recent time, the population of Labuan Bajo has 
been dominated by the presence of Manggaraian people of the interior of West 
Flores, and peoples from other parts of Flores Island. There has also been in 
very recent years a small group of foreigners, some of them European, 
Australian and American, who have sought to settle in Labuan Bajo because of 
the developing opportunities in tourism. Hence as time goes on, Labuan Bajo 
has become more and more diverse, what one might even call even 
‘cosmopolitan’.  
Labuan Bajo (Pelabuan Bajo literally translated as the harbour of the 
Bajo people) was not always such a bustling centre of economic activity, 
though, it has been a place of exchange for at least the past 200 years. 
According to an informant from Pulau14 Mesa, a small densely populated island 
                                                 
14 Pulau means ‘island’. 
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located just outside the park boundaries, Labuan Bajo has always been a 
meeting place between the “sea people” (the Bajo) and the “mountain people” 
(Manggarai people); this was based on an informal agreement between the 
“heads of the market” (kepala pasar), the Bajo representative staying in Pulau 
Bajo, a small island off Labuan Bajo. Many of the Bajo were known to have 
moored their boats in the protected lagoon off Labuan Bajo, and many 
established villages in the islands that are now in the KNP. Though it is not 
clear how long this arrangement persisted, settlement of non-coastal areas of 
Labuan Bajo town was believed to have begun sometime in the late 1800s by 
arrivals from Bima.  
 Over the centuries the western part of Flores had been variously 
controlled by different overlords: the Sultanate of Goa on the island of Sulawesi 
up to the 17th century, the Sultanate of Bima on the island of Sumbawa up to 
the 20th century, and finally the Dutch, until the end of World War II (Erb 
1999). In perhaps as early as the 15th and 16th centuries the kingdoms of Bima 
on the island of Sumbawa and Goa (Makassar) on the island of Sulawesi started 
to take an interest in western Flores, perhaps due to cinnamon and sandlewood 
that could be found there, and developed a rivalry over the territory of 
"Manggarai" that lasted for centuries (Erb 1997, Verheijen 1991). In the 
beginning of the 17th century the King of Goa converted to Islam, and 
subsequently the Sultanate of Goa became a powerful force throughout eastern 
Indonesia, gaining control over Bima, and forcing their king to convert as well 
(Noorduyn 1987, cited in Erb 1997). When the Dutch conquered Goa in 1667, 
Bima was freed from Goanese control and later Dutch East India Company 
contracts put Manggarai in Bimanese hands (Erb 1997). At that time many 
refugees swarmed to Flores from the island of Celebes (present day Sulawesi), 
among them quite possibly Buginese and Bajo. Bima and Goa kept up their 
rivalry over the western part of Flores for several centuries though, each 
supporting different local leaders at different times. The name ‘Manggarai’ to 
refer to the western part of the island of Flores dates from perhaps the 17th 
century. Stories tell that a Bimanese vessel tried to anchor in the harbour of Reo 
on the north coast of western Flores, and the anchor was taken away by a 
current; he called out in Bimanese, “mangga rai!”, “the anchor has run off!”, 
and after that the land was referred to by this name (Erb 1997, 1999). 
 Possibly during the time of Bimanese control, a system of governing 
and tax collecting was set up, where leaders, called dalu, of different territories, 
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would be directly responsible to the Sultan’s representative for collecting taxes 
and governing a district15. Under the dalu were representatives of smaller 
territories, leaders called ‘gelarang’16. In Manggarai, traditionally there were 38 
dalu, a system that remained in effect even up to the post-colonial period (Erb 
1999). In the most westerly part of what became known as “Manggarai”, the 
amount of influence from Bima was greater than in other areas, because of its 
proximity to the island of Sumbawa. The dalu districts of westerly Manggarai, 
Nggorang and Mburak, were where many Bimanese from Sumbawa settled. In 
the village of Warloka, in Mburak, graves were found in the 1960’s which 
indicated very ancient trading with Chinese traders to the islands of eastern 
Indonesia (ibid:66). Villagers in Warloka today tell tales that link them closely 
to the Sultanate of Bima (ibid). According to historical records, Bimanese took a 
lot of slaves from the interior of Manggarai, and viewed the mountain people as 
‘barely human’ (Coolhaas 1942, quoted in Erb 1997). Hence there was an early 
distinction between the coastal settlers, who were Muslims who had migrated 
from Bima or Goa, versus the mountain folk, who later became the focus of 
missionary work after the Dutch took control of Flores in the early 20th century. 
Over the course of the 20th century the Florenese population of the interior were 
almost entirely converted to Catholicism, while the coastal fishing peoples 
remain Muslim.  
 This general religious division remains true until today in Labuan Bajo 
and the environs of the Komodo National Park. The fishing populations resident 
on the islands in and near the park are all Muslim, while the town of Labuan 
Bajo has seen a large influx of Catholic migrants from the interior of Flores, 
mostly Manggaraian, who have dominant political and economic positions in 
the town. The fishing communities are thus in several ways slightly marginal to 
wider Florenese political, economic and social life. However there are cross-
cutting connections with members of different classes, ethnicities and religions 
into the communities that are located in the park; these are based on business 
ties, as well as interest in more recent years from mainland Florenese NGOs to 
offer aid to fishing communities, as well as attempts on the part of some 
                                                 
15 According to Verheijen ‘dalu’ is a Bimanese word so this system possibly began 
during the time of Bimanese rule, J.A.J. Verheijen, Manggarai dan Wujud Tertinggi, p. 
31, see Erb 1997. 
16 Gelarang or gallarang, is a Goanese word, see Cummings 2002, referred to below 
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individuals to make political alliances with these communities. Hence 
relationships between people cannot be simply discussed in terms of their 
membership in distinct neatly defined ‘communities’. 
 
“Communities” of the Park: History and traditional social organisations 
 
I will explore in this section the stories that I have received from people of 
different ethnic groups about the history of their settlement in the area. I will 
then go on to analyze some of the dynamics involved in the structure of these 
communities as they exist today in the vicinity of the park. 
The Bajo are said to be the earliest to have settled in the region. Indeed, many of 
the islands in KNP have names of Bajo origin. Other islands such as Pulau 
Seraya Kecil and Pulau Seraya Besar were settled in the 1940s.  The Bajo are a 
group that is highly nomadic, and are found from the Sulu Sea in southern 
Philippines, into Sabah, from southern Sulawesi, across to Papua (Warren 1983, 
Nimmo 1972). The Bajo have been active in and around Makassar, the 
important port on the island of Sulawesi where the Sultanate of Goa was 
located, since before the 16th century. Skilled boat builders, strand-gatherers, 
seamen and pirates, they also traded items such as sea cucumber, tortoise-shell, 
pearls, mother of pearl and other marine products all over the Indonesian 
archipelago (Villiers 1990: 145). In the sixteenth century, some of these Bajo 
were established in the Sangkarang Islands, a group of small islands off the west 
coast of Sulawesi opposite Makassar. The commander of the Portuguese forces 
that overthrew Makassar in 1666, described them as a ‘very useful people’, “… 
who collect tortoise shell and are obliged to deliver to the king of Makassar. 
Furthermore they must always be ready to go with their boats in any direction 
they may be sent, wherever the king from time to time sees more advantage to 
be gained, since they are the type of men who are known as slaves of the 
king…” (in Villiers 1990: 146) 
 According to Verheijen (1986), a Dutch missionary who did linguistic 
and ethnological studies of people living on Flores and Komodo islands, the 
Bajo functioned as carriers for the feudal lords and it was the task of the Bajos 
to bring tribute regularly from the seven western Manggarai dalus (feudal 
chiefs) and from the community on Komodo, to the Sultan in Bima, on the 
neighbouring island of Sumbawa to the west (Verheijen 1986: 29). Komodo 
Island has historically been regarded as ethnically distinct from the other islands 
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in the vicinity. The ata Komodo or Komodo people had their own language as 
well as a separate cultural identity (Verheijen 1987). According to a long term 
resident in Kampung Komodo, the last descendant of the ata Komodo died in 
1984. Komodo remains ethnically distinct from the other villages in the vicinity 
of the park today, because of the higher numbers of migrants from Sape, on the 
island of Sumbawa. The people of Komodo are regarded with some derision by 
the Bugis and the Manggaraian respondents, as well as by the park rangers I 
spoke to. One ranger from Kalimantan, referred to them as “the laziest people” 
and the commandant at Loh Liang, the harbour where tourists boats anchor on 
Komodo Island, warns people to stay away from the people of Komodo and 
look after their belongings because these villagers are known to steal. To 
illustrate the stupidity of the Komodo people, two informants told me the 
following story about when Komodo decided to wage war on Sumba. 
 
The people on Komodo had a wooden anchor and decided to 
set sail for Sumba. However, they forgot to untie the anchor 
from the Assam (tamarind) tree. As it was dark, they 
assumed that they’d already set sail. When they heard the 
chickens crowing later on, they assumed they’d arrived on 
Sumba and killed the villagers and looted the village, 
unaware they were in their own village. It is said that in 
Gillimotang, there are still “rope marks” on newly growing 
tamarind trees as a memorial to this event. Chickens can also 
be heard crowing in the morning but they are never seen. 
 
It is not clear how Komodo was settled but respondents mentioned that it was 
one of the first places settled in the Komodo National Park, along with Mesa, 
Rinca and later Pappagarang. There is only one village on Komodo Island. 
 Stories were also told to me about the Bajo. It is not known when they 
arrived in the waters of Eastern Indonesia, but respondents tell stories that 
explain how they came to these isles. The present day representation of Bajos as 
being simple, peace loving, tolerant and generous people--though not wholly 
untrue--belies their role in the history of the lesser Sunda Islands. According to 
a Bajo respondent in Labuan Bajo, the Bajo in Eastern Indonesia originated 
from Riau.   
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The Sultan of Goa kidnapped a princess from Riau as she 
was very beautiful. The furious Sultan of Riau sent the 
Bajo after the Sultan of Goa and warned them if that they 
do not succeed in bringing her back, they should not return 
as he would kill them and their descendants. For that 
reason, many Bajo did not dare to return and sought refuge 
with the Sultan of Bima. In return for his protection, the 
Bajo acted as look outs for the Sultan to keep watch for 
Portuguese invaders and settled in the islands between 
Bima and Flores.17 
 
However, this story was denounced as ‘nonsense’ by other Bajo informants. 
Another Bajo informant told of how the Bajo originated from China; four 
brothers decided to sail away together. When their boat broke down and sunk, 
they drifted to different places, one of those places was Flores. Where ever 
people say the Bajo first came from, they claim the Bajo did not initially settle 
on the mainland of Flores, but resided on the island facing the present day town 
of Labuan Bajo, aptly named Pulau Bajo.   
 Many informants, though not able to describe the exact origins of the 
Bajo in the area, were able to trace back family history to the time of the Sultan 
of Goa and the Sultan of Bima, and told how the Bajo at that time were 
instrumental to their overlords for maritime transport, security and warfare. 
However, not much is written about the social organization of the Bajos outside 
their relationship with their terrestrial overlords. Verheijen, who writes 
extensively about the Sama Bajau language, also touches on migration and 
kinship in his book on the Sama-Bajau of the Lesser Sunda Islands (Verheijen 
1986). However, he does not elaborate on the issue of class amongst the Bajo. 
During interviews with fishermen living in the KNP, the reign of several Bajo 
                                                 
17 Warren (1983) reports a slightly different version of what she calls the “Johor 
princess myth” where the Bajau, charged with the safe conduct of the princess of Johor 
to her betrothed, are banished from their homeland for failing to protect the princess 
when she is captured en route by the envious Sultan of Brunei. For this reason, the 
Bajau are forced to remain at sea to begin their wanderings, never to return to their 
homeland in the Malay Peninsula (Warren 1983: 5). 
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punggawas18 who ruled over the Bajo in the islands is often mentioned. 
According to them, the presence of Bajo punggawas dates back to the kingdom 
of Goa (Cummings 2002), and continued throughout Bimanese and Dutch rule 
and later Japanese occupation.  
 The punggawa, a position of political power, traditionally of Bajo 
descent, was the spiritual and moral authority of the Bajo who lived in the 
islands. Punggawas were said to descend from the lolo Bajo19 or Bajo 
aristocracy. The lolo Bajo legitimized the rule of the Raja of Goa over the Bajo, 
and according to one informant, was equivalent to the position of karaeng or 
lord. According to Cummings, during the sixteenth century: 
 
Gowa’s rulers began to create a hierarchy of positions 
and titles that would endure beyond the lifespan of 
personal kinship links between individuals…Some 
communities were transformed into [tributaries] for the 
noble who held the title—the kareang-ship—of the area. 
The most powerful rulers of important communities 
were titled kareang;…other local lords were called 
gallarrang…More important than these individual 
designations was the recognition that they represented 
particular ranks or positions within a Makassarese 
society whose pinnacle was in Gowa. Not rigid or 
unchanging, this evolving hierarchy of positions and 
titles nevertheless marked out a comparatively coherent 
                                                 
18 Punggawa, a Javanese term for officials that fulfilled the positions and functions in 
the King’s administration, were also known by the more general term abdidalem 
(king’s servants) (Moertono 1968: 93). Although Javanese society had an open elite, 
the King’s officials traditionally were recruited mainly from prijaji class, the social 
group that essentially consisted of the King’s punggawa but gradually came to include 
their families and descendants (Moertono 1968: 95). 
19 Verheijen notes that, “Lolo- “father” is Macassarese. In Longos it is used with regard 
to respected people. Mk Lolo was a title for a chief of the Bajos.” (See Verheijen 1986: 
206, no.88) In his Bajo word list, Lolo is listed as a word that refers to father; 
nobleman (aha lolo) or nobility (bansa lolo). (Ibid: 92.) 
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system of relative statuses and clear political and social 
relationships within an integrated whole (Cummings 
2002: 29). 
 
 Informants in Labuan Bajo concur that in the 19th century there was 
much pirate activity and instability in this region. On certain islands, the 
presence of lolo Bajo helped keep pirates away because the Bajo were also 
armed with weapons, as naval warriors for the Sultan of Bima. According to an 
informant on Pulau Mesa, the Bajo had their own weapons to keep pirates away 
(including a canon). Under the rule of the punggawa, the punggawa was 
responsible for ensuring that justice was served by meting out punishments to 
wrong doers. Punishment was severe, for example, a thief would have his hands 
cut off if he was caught stealing. For this reason, the Bajo were very afraid of 
committing crimes in the territory of the punggawa. 
 Verheijen also notes that though the Bajo carried out some services for 
the Sultan of Bima, they were not regarded as ordinary subjects. From his 
review of archival lawsuits, he found that the Bajo were referred to together 
with princes and high officials, as well as ‘…and Bajos or important or well to 
do people’ (See Verheijen 1986: 203, n. 63).  This is not surprising as Bajos 
played a vital role in the burgeoning slave trade between Manggarai and Bima, 
contributing substantially to the Bimanese economy. As carriers of tribute for 
the Sultan of Bima, the Bajo were also slave runners, transporting slaves from 
inland Manggarai to Bima for trade in Batavia. This demand began in the 17th 
century when the Dutch opened pepper and sugar plantations in Western 
Indonesia that required cheap labour in large numbers (Erb 1999: 88) . In the 
18th century, slaves were the most important good traded from Manggarai, with 
demand outstripping supply. Villages were raided increasingly frequently for 
slaves to be sold not just in Bima but also in Makassar, by pirates and Bimanese 
administrators alike. (Ibid)  
 The Bajo were active in the slave trade, hunting, transporting, selling 
and owning slaves. Verheijen also suggests that Bajos did not only transport 
slaves from subordinate dalus to the Bimanese government but sold and owned 
slaves for their own profit, as told to him by the mother and sister of his 
informant, Sahamma (Verheijen 1986: 29). An informant in Labuan Bajo also 
tells of how his mother, Lolo Intang, came to Labuan Bajo from Southern 
Sulawesi with forty slaves she had bought. These slaves were then put to work 
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clearing Pulau Kukusan Kecil and Pulau Kukusan Besar to clear land for 
agriculture there. His mother also had a silver belt and bracelet that was 
bestowed to her ancestors by the Raja of Goa, further strengthening his claim to 
Bajo aristocracy.  
 Wiltshire documents in her case study of Wakatobi National Park 
(Wiltshire 1998), how the position of punggawa continues to hold a special 
cultural significance in South Sulawesi, where there are still many Bajo 
residents. According to her respondents, since the time of the Bone kingdom, a 
Sama-Bajo had customarily been inaugurated as punggawa and presented with a 
flag called ula-ula as a mark of the king’s protection. This flag was used as a 
signal of the king’s permission for fishing activities, as well as during times of 
war, where the flag would be planted in the coast to announce to the Bajo that 
war had officially begun. The flag was also surrounded by great superstition and 
is not opened other than for traditional events for fear of supernatural reprisal. 
According to Wiltshire’s informant, the flag had last been flown during tribal 
wars sometime during 1900—1920s (Wiltshire 1998: 78). 
Respondents in Labuan Bajo reported that they had also had an ula-ula 
which they had flown on Pulau Bajo during the Dutch colonial period. The 
punggawa at the time, Suedy20, a Bajo originally from Selayar in Sulawesi, was 
chosen to be punggawa at aged 16. Though a lolo Bajo, he did not inherit this 
position as a direct descendant (usually from father to son) from the last 
punggawa21, rather it is said he derived this position from his grandparents 
(nenek). Suedy was chosen as he was literate, having attended school, literacy 
being a quality valued by the Sultan of Bima. Suedy, was said to have been from 
Pulau Longos, the island farthest north off of Flores. An emissary of the Sultan 
of Bima, his rule stretched over the islands Longos, Boleng, Medang, Mesa, 
Papagarang, Rinca, Komodo, Seraya Besar and Seraya Kecil, as well as 
Kukusan. An informant in Pulau Kukusan, himself a descendant of the lolo 
                                                 
20 Verheijen actually interviewed Suedy (Sawedi) regarding the numbers of Bajo in 
Western Flores. “According to the former Penggawa of the Bajos in western Flores, Mr 
Sawedi, their number in 1941 was approximately 1,000 people. The now living Bajos in 
the same area number some 6,500 at least.” (See Verheijen 1986: 200, n.54) However, 
Verheijen does not elaborate about the position of the penggawa/ punggawa in Bajo life. 
There is also no reference to the word in his glossary of Bajo words. 
21 It was said that Suedy was related to the preceding punggawa by marriage (ipar punggawa) 
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Bajo, said that the centre of power was determined by where the punggawa 
chose to move. Each village on each island in the punggawa’s territory was said 
to have a leader, who represented the punggawa in his absence. Each of these 
islands was also said to have its own boundaries, marked by taka, maritime 
markers in the form of sand spits, coral reefs, and small islands, that defined the 
span of rule of each emissary of the punggawa. These boundaries were not 
exclusive; fishermen from other islands were welcome to fish in the area but the 
villagers of the island had the right to exclude them, for example if they 
disapproved of their fishing methods. 
Verheijen noted that the Bajo dialect in Longos island is strikingly 
different from that spoken by other Bajo communities. He writes: 
 
….the forefathers came from Celebes (Sulawesi), 
allegedly, and declared their submission to the then 
mighty ruler of Gunong Talo who allotted them a place 
which was called Labuanbajo afterwards. After the 
inhabitants increased considerably, a good number of 
them moved to Papagarang. From there some of them 
went to Rinca, some to Mesa and others to the isle of 
Boleng. From Boleng some settled on the isle of 
Medang from where they visited the island Longos, 
which is called Sapoh by the Bajos… The tribute of 
Bajos in Longos consisted of kima (clam) shells. Yearly 
this tribute was shipped to the sultan of Bima together 
with the tribute beeswax from the dalu of Pacar.” 
(Verheijen 1986: 25, n.58a). 
 
However, many of the lolo Bajo on Pulau Longos had been refugees from the 
separatist movement in Sulawesi in the 1950s, shortly after independence of 
Indonesia from the Dutch22. Many Bajo came to Labuan Bajo and the 
surrounding islands to seek shelter from the violence, as well as from pirates. 
According to respondents in Labuan Bajo and Pulau Seraya Kecil, Suedy was 
                                                 
22 Rivalries between North and South Sulawesi, resulted in a rebellion in the South of Sulawesi, led by 
Qahhar Mudzakkar  against the proposal that Sulawesi to join Sukarno’s new republic. (See Harvey 
1977) 
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also said to have lived on Pulau Bajo and later in Labuan Bajo, along with other 
lolo Bajo.  
 Given the information from Verheijen, and what I gathered from 
informants as well, the Bajo appear quite opposite to the reputation they often 
tend to have as maritime drifters with unstable alliances. The Bajo were not 
merely sea nomads, but occupied entrenched positions within both monarchies 
of Bima and Goa historically. The existence of aristocratic families within the 
Bajo also has implications for present day Bajo identity, social organization and 
claims within KNP, as will be shown below. 
During the colonial period, Manggarai was freed from the overlordship 
of the Sultan of Bima. When the Dutch took over direct control, they initially 
left Manggarai in the hands of the Sultan of Bima, but when missionaries 
became more numerous in Western Flores, they lobbied for a king to come from 
Manggarai itself, so that Manggarai would be free from a Muslim overlord. In 
1930, a Manggaraian man became king, and later at the end of the colonial era, 
his brother became the first district head in Manggarai (Erb 1999). With the end 
of the control of the sultanate of Bima, and the demise of positions of 
aristocracy and royalty as positions of power in the modern Indonesia state, the 
punggawa position also lost its political legitimacy. In its attempt to institute a 
new system of national law, the New Order government implemented the 
“village law” in 1979, which implemented a new administrative system called 
“Desa Gaya Baru”. By differentiating adat or ‘traditional law and custom’, often 
linked with religion, from secular, and thus national, administration, the state 
was able to penetrate into local affairs by controlling secular matters, like 
positions such as the village leader, and strategies, such as village development 
plans (Hill 1992: 273). The transformation of the village government through 
this law began in the 1980s by the uniform formation of villages, either called 
desa or kelurahan, led by either kepala desa or lurah. Village hamlets below 
that level were known as dusun. In this way the divisions of dalu territories, and 
all the various functionaries under the dalu, disappeared. The new positions of 
power, regent or district head (bupati), sub-district head (camat), and village 
head (kepala desa), were appointed by the central government, or, as in the case 
of the village head, chosen by the villagers, but ratified by the central 
authorities. In this way, throughout Indonesia, traditional systems of political 
power at the local level were gradually eroded away.  
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However, descendants of the punggawa and lolo Bajo up to the present 
day, continue to play important roles in the community. The transition from a 
court system to an administrative system has also meant that the lolo Bajo of 
each island likewise became administrators of the New Order. The introduction 
of central authority was most striking in the appointment of leaders to the desa 
and lurah. Though village and hamlet communities are able to nominate 
individuals to fill these positions, the local subdistrict head was able to veto 
certain candidates deemed to be unsuitable, appointing the leader from two 
nominations finally submitted to him. When the desa is ‘upgraded’ to kelurahan 
status, all salaried officials at both hamlet (now called lingkungan) and village 
level become civil servants whose obligations are entirely to the administrative 
hierarchy. By definition, kelurahan, unlike desa, no longer have the right to 
manage their own affairs. These leaders become salaried civil servants, thus 
ensuring their primary loyalties are to the central and regional government 
rather than to their own ‘electorate’. Their position is no longer vulnerable to 
local censure but is rather ratified and enforced by the authority of the state. The 
position of these appointed leaders is further reinforced by their control, in 
consultation with an advisory council of village elite (LKMD-Lembaga 
Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa), of all development funds channelled to the 
village. Not only does this consolidate the authority of the village head and elite, 
it also gives them access to ‘commissions’ of various kinds in administering 
such funds (Hill 1992: 273-274). 
As a result, in at least one desa in KNP, kepala desas and key members 
in each village are descendants of the lolo Bajo, and retain key decision making 
powers over these communities. The traditional position as a spiritual and moral 
leader has been translated into a political and administrative one, that is located 
within the government bureaucratic structure. In the past, a punggawa’s power 
was his material wealth, spiritual power and his link to the lolo Bajo. Today, 
descendants of the lolo Bajo have been quick to make use of their extended 
networks to their economic advantage. What is important to recognize is that 
some of the present day Hajis, that is those influential men who have power and 
wealth who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca, are second generation Bajo 
whose parents arrived from Sulawesi, rather than from the islands within the 
park. However, it is often mentioned that they derive from royalty (either 
directly from Bajo nobility -lolo Bajo- or kinship with the punggawa, or 
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sometimes through marriage eg. through their wives), which in turn legitimates 
their position as village heads (kepala desa).  
What I want to discuss in the next section is how these prominent Bajo 
people have capitalized on their aristocratic descent, and present political 
positions to become middle men in the commercial fishing industry that has 
expanded into the communities of the park over the past several decades. 
Without their positions as middle men, the fishing industry would take on a very 
different shape in the park. As far as the conservation organizations are 
concerned these men are the major culprits in the destructive fishing methods 
that had been proliferating in the park before the presence of the TNC beginning 
in 1995. In the present day, though destructive activities have abated 
considerably, covert activities continue, though it is not always clear who are 
the culprits. There exists a patron-client relationship between many of the 
descendants of the punggawa, based principally on their material wealth and 
strengthened by their religious attainment of being a ‘haji’. These are important 




Fishing in the park  
 
A TNC report in 1996, gave a good overview of the different livelihood 
strategies pursued by different communities located in the park. An estimated 
97% of the park population are engaged in fishing activities (Bakar 1996: 7), 
economic position often determines access to resources such as gear and fishing 
type. Different fishing techniques also reflect the differing social ties between 
different strata within communities. Often, capital intensive fishing techniques 
require the support of patron-client relationships as financial institutions are not 
available to the less well off (ibid: 24). 
Fishing techniques can be broadly divided into two categories- 
commercial and subsistence fishing. Most fishing techniques in the park are 
subsistent, largely for local consumption. Commercial fishing is usually capital 
intensive and requires the use of networks and middlemen as the fish are usually 
sent to faraway markets.  
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The variety of fishing methods used in KNP is summarised below (from Bakar 
1996: 7-13):  
 
“Bagan”- local name for specially designed motorboats 
equipped with lift nets and kerosene lanterns…used at night 
to catch squid, anchovies and sardines…the catch is shipped 
to either Bali or Surabaya.  
 
“Meting” or Gleaning of the reefs- Marine biota collected are 
sea cucumber, abalone and a variety  of molluscs… takes 
place during low tide and is done on foot by men, women and 
children. This is regarded as destructive due to the trampling 
of corals and the use of iron bars to retrieve abalone from 
crevices. 
 
“Pukat” or Drag nets- This is used especially to collect reef 
fish, as well as small pelagic fish, anchovies and shrimp.  
 
Hook and line- Not a popular method, limited to Kampung 
Rinca and Kerora, occurring between periods of main fishing 
activities. Reef fish caught are processed and salted.  
 
“Nener” or harvesting of milkfish larvae- carried out by 
mostly women and children. The catch is either sold to 
purchasing agents or directly to Labuan Bajo. This generates 
significant additional income as milkfish larvae are priced 
between Rp20 and 25 per fish. One person can collect up to 
2000 larvae a day ( 9) 
 
“Bubu” or fishtraps- Fish traps made of bamboo and set in the 
reefs to catch reef fish for salting and local consumption. (11) 
 
“Tuba” (Derris elliptica)- A poison derived from the root of 
the local tuba tree which is used to drug reef fish such as 
rabbitfish. The use of tuba may yield many fish as drugged 
fish can be taken with nets. (11) 
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Diving- Using compressors (hoka), local fishermen can 
gather species such as sea cucumbers, young pearl oysters and 
abalone. High start-up costs limit this technique to the 
wealthier members of the community. This is regarded as a 
destructive process as divers often dislodge and damage 
corals when using iron bars to pry off abalone. (13) 
 
 
In a list compiled by TNC, destructive fishing methods (such as blast fishing, 
fishing with poison, the use of gillnets and long lines), overharvesting and 
poaching were considered the biggest threats to the resources in KNP (PKA and 
TNC 2000a: 18).  Of particular concern was the use of cyanide to catch fish for 
the live fish trade. The use of cyanide on coral often spells death for the reefs, 
the home and spawning sites of many fish and invertebrate populations. Such 
reefs are thought to take decades to regenerate to their original states (Johanes 
and Riepen 1995: 27). 
According to a report prepared for The Nature Conservancy by its 
consultants Robert Johannes and Michael Riepen, the live fish trade has 
devastated most viable reefs in the Philippines and hence the trade has been 
forced further east into Indonesia, Papau New Guinea as well as the Pacific 
Islands to exploit the tropical reefs there (Johannes and Riepen 1995: 5).  
Economic prosperity in affluent Asian (Chinese) centres such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan has increased demand for live fish, where eating highly 
priced live fish during social events is a sign of status. The eating of fish in 
Chinese culture is a symbolically and socially entrenched practice, though the 
eating of live reef fish in Hong Kong has only become popular since the 1960s 
when live fish from nearby reefs became available in large quantities (ibid: 11). 
This demand is expected to increase with China’s continued economic 
expansion (ibid: 12). 
 In 1995, Indonesia accounted for 50% of the 20 to 25000 tonnes of live 
fish exported to Asian markets (ibid: 17, 12). Johannes and Riepen state that 
“there is nothing inherently wrong, environmentally or socially, with supplying 
the demand for live reef fish… practical, non-destructive ways of supplying the 
demand are available” (ibid: 10). However, the destruction of fish habitats 
through the rampant use of cyanide for short term gain greatly accelerates the 
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demise of the reefs and its stock, and concentrates the profits from the fish trade 
in the hands of relatively few parties- namely the companies and the 
bureaucracy. Their report also documents the difficulties that local communities 
that work for these companies often face. Johannes and Riepen report that some 
companies are oppressive in their dealings with villagers, providing inadequate 
training or none at all in the use of faulty diving equipment, resulting in 
mortalities and injuries (ibid: 20). Compensation is often meagre in comparison 
to the value of the fish caught, fishers in Papua New Guinea received US$1.08/ 
kg (ibid: 22), a mere fraction of the value of a humphead wrasse US$50/kg 
(ibid: 38). 
 However, it is clear from the Management Plan that the incidence of 
destructive fishing is believed to be a result of the ignorance and lack of 
conservation awareness of residents in the park. This completely ignores the 
extensive social, economic and jural networks that are needed to participate in 
the trade, especially the sources of capital for infrastructure and the complicity 
of local bureaucrats and officials who facilitate its existence. 
 Celia Lowe’s study (Lowe 2003) on the Sama Bajo in Togean Islands 
focuses on how they are trapped by market forces, bureaucracy and 
representations of ethnicity as their marine environment is being rapidly 
degraded by the live fish trade’s use of cyanide. Furthermore, representations of 
Sama ethnicity and identity set the Sama up as scapegoats for the decline of 
their marine environment. 
 Their marginal bargaining position, as subjects of government poverty 
alleviation projects to help them ‘progress’, promoted the notion that the Sama 
are primitive and backward. While those who manage to fulfil material wants 
and ‘develop’ through the use of cyanide in the live fish trade, are  penalised for 
destroying the environment (Lowe 2003: 243). The setting up of fish camps23 
close to Sama villages also perpetuates the illusion that all Sama people use 
cyanide. The Sama are also caught up in a relationship of debt with the fish 
camps since the camps provide outboard motors as well as other material goods. 
The function of this relationship is more than monetary, the threat of revocation 
of outboard motors in particular, ensures that a steady supply of fish will be 
provided to the camp (249).  
                                                 
23 Fish camps are capital intensive buildings with holding pens to accumlate fish for later transportation 
by Live Fish Transfer Vessels (LFTV) and staffed by non- Tongean camp bosses (Lowe 2003: 243). 
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Lowe also cites the “entrepreneurial culture” that extends from the top 
of the Indonesian hierarchy, trickling down to local leaders and bureaucrats who 
are bound to reproduce a culture where economic benefit is capitalized upon and 
spread out, or else risk losing their positions (247). The complicity of 
bureaucrats and officials play a pivotal role in facilitating the trade in the 
procurement of permits for fish camps and custom forms, as these are major 
sources of revenue for poorly funded government agencies (251). The legalese 
that governs fish export also means that collaboration with multiple government 
agencies is required, thus it is in the bureaucracy’s interest to further the 
process.  
 Environmental legislation places the responsibility of environmental 
protection on the citizens and the state, where development and conservation are 
inseparable. The drive towards ‘development’ and progress however, creates a 
protected business environment, where the consequences of enforcement and 
environmental decline are borne by local communities (250). Furthermore, legal 
structures benefit fish camps, exporters and government officials who exploit 
the numerous tiny exceptions facilitating the capture rather than conservation of 
endangered fish (ibid). 
From Lowe’s accounts, the Sama are far from ignorant about the 
consequences rampant cyanide use will bring, however, economic exigencies 
and bullying from complicit officials and bureaucrats in the name of neo-liberal 
trade ideology have given them little option but to either participate or simply 
stay out of the operation’s way. Fishers in Komodo National Park are caught in 
a similar bind; patron-client relationships between middlemen and poor fishers 
mean that fishers have little or no bargaining power. During my fieldwork, 
respondents would not openly discuss the live fish trade in Labuan Bajo as it 
would mean implicating powerful individuals. A respondent did admit that Live 
Fish Transport Vessels (LFTV) from Taiwan or Hong Kong do enter park 
waters, but are reluctant to venture too far into park boundaries, due to the 
presence of patrols. “They are very scared; we had to signal them with lights for 
a long time before they would come nearer… In the end, we had to go to them. 
They are very scared because now there are patrols and they (TNC) have very 
fast boats. But we made sure that nobody saw us and there was no moon that 
night.” He also claimed that Napoleon Wrasse were still being shipped out but 
were very rare and usually much smaller than before. During my fieldwork in 
2003, floating fish cages (keramba) were evident just outside of the harbour, 
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though it is unclear to whom they belonged to. One respondent claimed it 
belonged to a Haji in town, another claimed that it was part of a fisheries project 
run by the government.24  
 Other possible evidence of the LFT was encountered during an 
interview with a local businessman who apologized because he had to leave 
abruptly to oversee his shipment of fish. A minibus (bemo) filled with 
styrofoam boxes labeled ‘Live animals’ pulled up shortly in front of the house 
which he boarded and directed to the airport. Other residents in Labuan Bajo 
recount stories of friends/ relatives/ tourists being ‘bumped off’ flights to make 
way for live fish cargoes to Bali. A guide in Labuan Bajo recounted the story 
when the fish cargo exceeded the weight allowed, the airline officials tried to 
get rid of two European tourists who had bought tickets just before the flight, 
but they made so much noise that in the end, a Manggaraian man was forced to 
‘postpone’ his trip to Bali. By turning down tourists, he said that it was obvious 
the business from the live fish trade was more important than tourism and that 
“…the locals always come last”. 
 The secrecy that surrounds the live fish trade made obtaining data 
almost impossible for a relative newcomer such as myself. However, people 
were much more forthcoming about bagan fishing, an approved form of fishing 
within KNP. Throughout the islands, this is the dominant commercial fishing 
method. Bagans are motorized lift-net boats that catch squid, anchovies and 
sardines. Bagan fishing takes place at dusk when fishermen go off to look for 
suitable fishing grounds. Large nets are then released into the depths of the sea 
and kerosene lamps are set up above the nets to lure the target species. Once 
enough animals aggregate in the net, the net is hauled up by the crew using a 
system of turnstiles. In one night, the nets can be dropped multiple times until 
the captain is satisfied with the catch. Boats return to the villages before dawn 
and the catch is usually sorted and set out to dry by the women before noon. 
 Bagan fishing is similar to the live fish trade as it requires substantial 
capital to start up. Almost all captains have had to borrow money from 
middlemen or traders to finance their bagans. Some are also bound to 
middlemen for other necessities such as electricity, fuel, water and even rice. In 
                                                 
24 As yet, aside from TNC’s short lived mariculture project (2003-2006), much of the 
fish for the Live Fish Trade (LFT) is assumed to be by destructive methods so as to 
make it lucrative enough for LFTVs to enter the area. 
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this way, the relationship between middlemen and fishers in KNP is very similar 
to the situation of the Sama Bajo in the Tongean Islands.  
 To finance the boat engines as well as the construction, boat captains 
enter into a financial agreement with one of the middlemen. These middlemen 
often finance new fishing boats in exchange for the exclusive rights to the catch 
of new boats. The fish are bought at market price from the fishermen and a 
percentage of the money is returned to the middlemen until the debt is paid off. 
Bagans cost between Rp 30 million to Rp 80 million to make25. Fishermen 
rarely have that amount of capital and will approach a ‘sponsor’ to help finance 
the construction.  
 Pak Haji H has helped commission fifteen bagans (atas nama- they are 
‘in his name’). The borrower is bound to sell all his catch to Pak Haji H, who 
claims to buy it at market prices. Each bagan brings in between 700kg to 1 
tonne of fish every evening. One kilogram of fish is about Rp 6000 (a bit more 
than one Singapore dollar). In the case of Pak H, anybody can approach him for 
‘help’ in commissioning a boat. He has various ‘debtors’ on several islands. 
Surprisingly, the key criteria is simply that the borrower is ‘reliable’. Pak Haji H 
claims to want to help increase the standard of living of the fishermen. After an 
initial meeting with the borrower, Pak Haji H takes about a week to do a 
character check before giving an answer. As the people living on the islands are 
often related by either blood or marriage, it is supposedly not difficult to find 
out if the person in question can be trusted.  Aside from trust, creativity, 
determination and a capacity for hard work are the qualities he looks for in a 
prospective client. The boats are usually built in Pulau Kukusan by two resident 
professional boat builders. 
 According to Haji Idris, the kepala desa of Pulau Mesa, a bagan can 
cost as little as Rp 10 million (hence about $2000 Singapore dollars) to 
construct. Captains of the bagan are then obligated to sell their catch to their 
lender at market price. In 2003, the price on Pulau Mesa for a kilogram of fresh 
squid was Rp 5000/ kg, whilst a kilogram of dried squid fetched Rp 8000/kg. 
Captains must sell their catch back to their lender until they have repaid the 
amount borrowed. In the event the captain chooses to sell his catch to someone 
else before the loan is repaid, the lender has the right to seize ownership of the 
                                                 
25 The exchange rate has been holding fairly steady for the opening years of the 21st century at around 
5000-5800 rupiahs to one Singapore dollar. So the cost is between 6000 and 16000 Singapore dollars. 
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bagan. Lenders are eager to finance boats as it guarantees them a minimum 
catch that they can in turn sell elsewhere in Indonesia. They are thus eager to 
accumulate as large amounts of fish or squid as possible in the shortest possible 
time. As there are many lenders eager to finance bagans, market prices have 
remained relatively competitive. 
 According to Haji Idris, borrowers are often related. However, H has 
begun to lend to whoever he feels is “capable, hardworking and diligent”, 
extending his network of supply beyond his relatives and his immediate 
villagers. Potential borrowers approach H with a proposal to finance a bagan. 
Haji H will then do his research on these potential borrowers— who have they 
worked for, are they hardworking and creative? Haji H holds creativity in high 
esteem as creative individuals have the ability to find the best fishing grounds. 
He has to rely on his network of friends and relatives for testimonials. In this 
way, the borrower is also held accountable for his loan as he has to have a good 
reputation and any attempt to dishonour the contract will be public knowledge. 
As the people living on the islands are often related by either blood or marriage, 
it is supposedly not difficult to find out if the person in question can be trusted. 
Social pressure is a strong incentive to repay loans. By lending to a group, the 
risk of an individual defaulting on the loan is reduced. By 2003, Haji H had 
financed 8 bagans. The boats are usually built on Pulau Kukusan by two 
resident professional boat builders, enabling Haji H to personally supervise the 
construction. Already, the entire village is tied to Pak Haji H as he supplies 
them with electricity from his generator. He claims that he makes a loss as some 
of the fishermen are unable to pay him for electricity, often delaying payment or 
making payment in kind with rice or fish. 
 The absence of financial institutions that will give loans to the average 
fisherman has thus allowed the development of such a system. As there is no 
system for registering bagans in Labuan Bajo, banks are not willing to lend the 
money to individuals. Banks are more willing to give loans to groups, usually 
up to a sum of Rp100 million. However, a lack of collateral and strict banking 
regulations have meant that fishermen are unable to borrow large amounts of 
money to finance their operations.  
 The resulting patron-client system has posed problems in the 
enforcement of illegal fishing methods. An interview with a member of the local 
NGO ASPRIDA reveals that it is often the richer fishermen in the community 
who use such illegal fishing methods. It did not make sense that people who had 
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spent generations living by the sea would be unaware of the detrimental 
consequences that reef bombing and cyanide fishing would bring. Apparently, 
only the richer and more influential members of a community had the money 
and the network to be involved in the live fish trade. Due to kinship and 
economic ties, it would be unlikely that they would be reported. ASPRIDA had 
hoped to help Pak Haji H and his village start up a co-operative so that the 
villagers can make use of the funds to get their catch to further markets and fund 
their own boats. However, such a scheme may also end up only benefiting the 
richer members of the community as negotiations have to proceed directly 
through the village head. 
 It is necessary to understand that increasingly fishing in the park area is 
done not for subsistence, but feeds into a commercial system, which results in 
more intensified fishing activities. These intensified activities, such as the use of 
bagan, and destructive fishing methods, are capital intensive, and result in a 
patron-client dependency. This intensification has been the result of a shifting of 
commercial fishing interests into this area over the past decades. As with the 
live fish trade, fishers I spoke to have reported an influx of buyers of fish and 
squid from other parts of Indonesia, including nearby Sape. One respondent 
explained that the Straits of Sape had been fished out, driving many Sape 
bagans and middlemen into the waters and shores of KNP26. The fish trade is 
thus also being driven further east. Buyers from Java, Ujung Pandang, Bali, 
Sape and even as far as Taiwan rely on the catches from KNP. A large cold 
storage facility exists on Binongko beach and every 2 weeks, the fish collected 
from local fishermen are sent to Surabaya. Another cold storage facility is 
owned by a Taiwanese businessman who sells fish collected in Labuan Bajo 
back to Taiwan. Local businessmen have also started selling fish in Ruteng, a 
four hour bus ride away from Labuan Bajo, since fish is a cheaper source of 
protein than meat. Often, they get teenagers to ride their motorbikes at high 
speed to Ruteng to arrive in time for the morning markets. As a respondent 
commented, “The best fish are gone by 9am. What is left is the fish brought in 
by fishermen who arrive late or the fish that nobody wants to buy.” 
                                                 
26 Bakar’s  report already indicated that the Sape fishermen were the most intensive, 
with the largest numbers of bagan, and the most intensive use of destructive fishing 
methods 10 years ago (Bakar 1996) 
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 Buyers and middlemen are thus finding that the situation is increasingly 
competitive. Local businessmen have an edge because their kinship ties and 
proximity enable them to expand their network of fishers, the only limit being 
the amount of capital they can lend. Relationships with buyers in the past were 
stable and long standing due to the remoteness of the area; fishers thus did not 
have much choice. However, in the face of such recent competition, once the 
loan is paid, fishers are not obligated to remain with their former debtor and 
may sell elsewhere. It is this competition that has kept market prices relatively 
competitive between buyers. Long standing loans are favourable for both 
middlemen and traders; there is no ‘minimum’ amount that has to be repaid 
every month other than the selling of their daily catch to their debtors. Again, 
the primary goal of the middleman is to ensure a constant supply of fish. 
 But the rapid increase in the number of bagan, as well as the influx of 
bagan from other parts of eastern Indonesia has resulted in stiff competition for 
squid and fish stocks. When I joined P for a night of fishing on his bagan, whilst 
looking for a place to drop anchor at night, other bagans had already dropped 
anchor nearby. Though P estimated that there were some 800 bagan in the park, 
the bulk of them were from Sape, where fish stocks have depleted rapidly in 
recent years. These boats are distinctive from boats from villages in and around 
the park, principally because they are larger and thus carry deeper and bigger 
nets.  
 This example of bagan fishing shows that fishers once again fall to the 
bottom of the “food chain” as the pressure from the market forces of the food 
fish industry, declining fish stocks and middlemen challenge their ability to 




In 1996, TNC, together with Yayasan Pusaka Alam Nusantara, published a 
report, “Resource Utilization In and Around Komodo National Park”, that 
attempted to “gain an understanding of local customs and socio-cultural, 
socioeconomic and environmental conditions” as a reference to developing a 
management programme for the park (Bakar 1996: 4). Subsequently, an 
updated version of those findings were presented in the 25 Year Management 
Plan for Komodo National Park when it was formally released in 2000.   
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 The Management Plan examines the demographics of the villages in 
and around the park, local economic activity (in particular fishing methods and 
income from fishing), institutions (“largely ineffective”), as well as the 
amenities such as health care and education that are available to park residents. 
(PKA and TNC 2000b: 55-59) Community relations were said to be 
harmonious and community structure relatively flat, though village institutions, 
such as the village administration (Lembaga Pemerintahan Desa) and village 
council (Lembaga Musyawarah Desa) are noted as “not functioning as 
intended, in particular on remote islands” (Bakar 1996: 23) . 
 Both reports note the powerful role of traders who control the local 
economy as the sole access point to markets. Due to the perishability of marine 
products, traders are able to control the prices of marine products in the local 
market. The lack of alternative lending institutions also means that fishermen 
often turn to such traders for loans, thus becoming locked into a cycle of debt. 
The Management Plan proposes the formation of fishing co-operatives, credit 
unions and direct market access to increase revenue for fishermen that will 
enable them avoid such relationships of patronage. (PKA and TNC 2000a: 17)  
 Of primary concern was the sharp increase in the park’s population of 
“1000% since 1930” due to high birth rates and in-migration ( PKA and TNC 
2000a: 67). The projected exponential growth of the human population would 
in turn increase terrestrial resource use (e.g. access to fresh water, cutting of 
fire wood and access to building materials) compromising the eco-systems 
within the park (ibid). Resettlement to larger islands such as Sumbawa and 
Flores was suggested as one way to reduce human populations in KNP with the 
lure of social and economic incentives.  
 Thus, despite extensive knowledge of the live fish trade, the poverty of 
fishers and the power of middlemen over residents in KNP, the Management 
Plan still chose to concentrate its efforts on reducing human impact on the 
national park, despite the fact that the islands have been populated for many 
centuries. In the next chapter, I attempt to examine the implications of the 
Management Plan and the reasons for the outrage it provoked in Labuan Bajo. I 
also look at how the issue has been positioned in the form of multiple 
storylines as mentioned by Haajer (1995) by multiple groups in order to further 
their own political, social and economic agendas.
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Chapter 5 TNC and communities  
 
TNC and Komodo National Park: Developing a Management Plan 
 
The Komodo National Park is now The Conservancy’s longest running marine project in 
Indonesia (Halim et al, 2007: 147). As mentioned in Chapter 3, The Nature Conservancy was 
invited by the Indonesian government to collaborate on the formulation of a management plan 
for Komodo National Park in 1995.  
 Komodo National Park is home to rich marine and terrestrial ecosystems. According 
to the Management Plan, in addition to terrestrial species such as the Komodo dragon and the 
Timor deer, the marine environment is home to more than 1000 species of fish, 260 species of 
reef-building coral, 70 species of sponges, 10 species of dolphin, 6 species of whales and 2 
species of sea turtle (PKA and TNC 2000a: 5). The plan proposed the creation of a marine 
and terrestrial reserve to protect these eco systems, in particular, to maintain the quality of the 
habitat of the Komodo Dragon, ensure sustainable use of park resources for tourism, 
education and research, as well as the protection and replenishment of exploited reef fish 
stocks and inveterbrates (ibid: 11). This plan then was the key factor in extending the 
boundaries of the park to include not just the terrestrial areas of Komodo and Rinca, but also 
the marine environment. 
 Little is said in the plan about the manner in which local stakeholders and community 
members would be part of the implementation, since most recommendations take the form of 
stricter enforcement of existing regulations, new regulations on fishing methods and living 
patterns. From TNC’s summary of stakeholder meetings from 1996 to 200327, the role of 
local stakeholders has been largely to support the management plan, as well as to convince 
fellow community members of its validity. Though it is not stated who exactly these 
‘stakeholders’ are, the bulk of meetings has been more concerned with clarification with 
regards to the joint venture with Putri Naga Komodo, as well as calls for greater transparency 
in the management of the park.  
In his thesis Henning Borchers makes a strong case that the Management Plan fails to 
not just meet, but to even recognise the livelihood realities of communities in the park 
(Borchers 2002). The lack of collaboration and non-participatory nature of the relationship 
with local communities resulted in increasingly negative interaction with the communities 
                                                 
27PKA & TNC 2003. Overview of Komodo Stakeholder Consultations, 1996 - 2003. 33 pp. 
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residing in and around the park. His research on Komodo Island uncovered a considerable 
amount of resentment of the TNC in the Komodo National Park. 
In practice, TNC has fallen for what Lowe calls the “official red herring” of the 
state’s progressivist ideology (Lowe 2003: 255), choosing to discipline and order park 
residents through its coastal zonation plan, rather than address the social inequities and 
bureaucratic inadequacies/ loopholes that enable the trade in live fish, food fish and deer meat 
to occur. The heavy-handed patrolling and surveillance which TNC instigated in the park 
from the beginning, was directed as much towards local communities as it was towards 
outsiders, despite the fact that their Report and Management Plan recognised that external 
market forces had resulted in destructive fishing practices that were compromising park 
biodiversity. Furthermore, it states that: 
 
“Preliminary data clearly show that it is communities from outside the park that are 
having the most damaging impact (Management Plan Book 1 2000: 22).” 
 
“Primary threat comes from outside communities in Sape, South Flores and Sulawesi.  
Local communities pose less of a threat, since they generally use ‘bagan’ lift-nets that 
are not destructive to the coral reef ecosystem (ibid: 33).” 
 
In a detailed report by TNC’s own consultants, they suggest that recommendations at 
the governmental, regulatory and commercial level to regulate and enforce the trade, and also 
to develop mariculture industries to breed, harvest and transfer live fish in a less destructive 
and wasteful manner (Johannes and Riepen 1995: 76-77). However, the focus of enforcement 
activities have largely been on park residents through the increased regulation, restriction and 
prohibition of resource access and types of use. With the proposal of a coastal zonation 
policy, the activities of park residents were considerably curtailed. To curtail the impact of 
human settlement further, the proposed zonation policy (Book 1: 44) demarcated KNP into 
multiple zones where only certain activities would be permitted.  
 The coastal zonation plan for KNP divides the park into seven discrete zones, with 
restrictions on economic and livelihood activities in all but two zones. The park was carved 
up into the following zones, using GPS co-ordinates: 
 
1. Core zone 
2. Wilderness zone 
3. Tourism use zone 
4. Traditional use zone 
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5. Pelagic use zone 
6. Special research and training zone 
7. Traditional settlement zone 
 
Each zone has its own set of strictly worded restrictions, where human activity if not 
outright banned, is strictly curtailed (KNP Coastal Zonation Information Sheet 2000:1). 
According to the sheet, ‘zoning within the park is based on available ecological data, current 
understanding of conservation and ecological principles, the socio-economic and cultural 
needs of local communities, and feasibility” (ibid). The primary objective being to protect the 
marine biodiversity and prevent outside communities such as those from Sape from using 
destructive fishing practices. By dividing the park into a series of concentric zones, park 
managers were theoretically able to control the type of activity that would occur in each zone. 
A series of licenses would allow residents in the settlements around the park to fish 
unfettered, provided they do not use prohibited fishing equipment and fish only in approved 
zones (ibid: 45). The number and type of licenses to be issued will be decided by a marine 
survey of fish stocks, fishing fleets, with the consultation of village leaders (ibid). 
 For example, present settlements within the park are located in “traditional settlement 
zones”, governed by a list of regulations and prohibitions pertaining to trash disposal (must be 
sorted into hazardous and non-hazardous waste), accommodation (no tourist accommodation 
allowed), water use (strictly limited), immigration (prohibited), pets (prohibited) and so on. 
(PKA and TNC 2000a: 50) The creation of zones around the park has also meant that fishing 
activity has become highly regulated for park residents, limiting their fishing grounds to 
“Traditional Use Zones” and “Pelagic Use Zones” (ibid: 46-49). The introduction of licences 
and “exclusive rights” based on quota allocations per village and negotiation between village 
heads, “closed seasons” and other bureaucratic regulations have now territorialized the fishing 
grounds within the park, complicating and politicizing the situation further.  
The regulations governing each zone are wordy and unrealistic, in particular those 
that govern traditional settlement zones (ibid: 50). The growing human population in the park 
has caused concern as there is worry that it will outstrip the amount of resources within the 
park.  Thus, there are regulations to limit the amount of in-migration as well as access to 
essentials such as fresh water. These regulations are piece meal directives that aim to limit 
human impact on the environment, rather than an organized attempt to improve the standard 
of living of residents so that they may participate in value added activities (such as tourism or 
marine product processing) and depend less directly on resource exploitation. Implicit in 
these directives is the idea that a rise in the standard of living and free access to resources will 
encourage an influx of new migrants that will further tax the national park’s resources, hence 
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the need for control and restraint. Rather than increasing the level of education and number of 
opportunities for park inhabitants in the long run, TNC has focused on short run issues of in-
migration and resource control.  
 Two of the biggest problems that face villagers is the lack of fresh water and health 
services. Life on these islands is difficult as fresh water and fresh food has to be purchased 
from nearby Labuan Bajo. Though land is suitable for agriculture, water remains a challenge. 
In any case, agriculture is not allowed within the park. Health services can only be found on 
Kampung Komodo, and even then this has been reported to be unreliable. Malaria is a 
perennial problem and according to the women, infant mortality is high. Almost all the 
women I had spoken to had lost at least one child under 2 years of age to sickness, during 
childbirth or through a miscarriage.  Schools are poorly stocked and have few resources at 
their disposal. (In one school, it was hinted that the principal pocketed a large percentage of 
the already very small government budget allocated to the school.) The zonation plan does 
not provide alternatives (except for leaving the park) nor does it provide the organizational 
systems necessary to implement any of its regulations. The human-nature dichotomy is thus 
played out, pitting the welfare of humans against biodiversity through the regulation of 
everyday practice in space.  
According to the TNC’s report on socio-economic conditions of park inhabitants, 
80% of the population earn a living from bagan fishing or lift net fishing. Statistics from the 
same report estimate that there are 800 bagans operating in the waters of KNP. A large 
majority of these bagans do not originate from communities living within the park. Most of 
them originate from Sape, Bima, as well as Labuan Bajo. There have been attempts to 
regulate the number of bagans operating in these waters. Posts have been set up in various 
sites on Pulau Komodo, Rinca and Padar. Captains have to report to the rangers at these posts 
before obtaining a pass that will allow them to fish in the park. These passes are to be 
presented when the boat is stopped by a patrol. Captains without passes supposedly can be 
arrested. Captains are obliged to provide information such as the names of their crew, place of 
origin, colour (for identity purposes) and make of their boats and proposed fishing ground for 
the night. Such information will supposedly help the KNP gather more comprehensive 
information about the actual numbers of fishing boats operating within the park, origin of 
these boats and their crew as well fishing methods used and preferred fishing areas, as well as 





Unsurprisingly, the plan has not been easy to implement. For one, the overwhelming 
emphasis on enforcement has alienated local communities that have been utilising the marine 
resources unfettered for the past 200 years. Hostility towards these regulations seem to be on 
two levels. On one hand, there is resentment that marine resources that were traditionally 
‘theirs’ have now been appropriated by the state. On the other hand, the TNC is seen as the 
main perpetrator in this ‘theft’, the PHPA, though an agent of the state, was merely a puppet 
of the TNC. The TNC, it seemed, had even less of a ‘right’ to impose these sanctions. Some 
respondents saw themselves as being another project to attract donors by the TNC to enrich 
itself. As one respondent on Kukusan put it, “THEY need US to survive. Who will give them 
money if they don’t have this project? WE don’t need them.” 
As noted by one villager from Kampung Komodo, “They are trying to kill us, not 
help us. They are just waiting for us to die… Animals are more important than people.” In 
effect, the zonation plan penalizes existing communities in the park. This view was 
strengthened when in 2002, it was reported that unarmed fishermen had been shot and killed 
by these patrol boats. The local communities were outraged by this excessive use of force and 
this became the symbol of TNC’s uncompassionate ‘nature before people’ approach to 
managing KNP.  
On a day to day basis, the larger issue that concern park residents is the regulation of 
fishing practice within the park. Despite the intricate wording and obvious pains to clearly 
define permissible activity in each zone, feasibility really means convenience in mapping the 
precise boundaries on paper.  In reality, these boundaries were not at all feasible in terms of 
enforcement or implementation due to lack of capacity by the TNK coupled by the sheer size 
of the park.  More disturbingly, members of the local fishing community remained in the dark 
about the precise nature of these restrictions. During my visit to Pulau Seraya Kecil in 2003, 
P, a bagan fisherman, asked E, an employee of TNC, about these new rules as he was worried 
that he might unintentionally fish in the ‘wrong’ zone. He had heard about these new rules but 
had not been given any details about the rules and how these rules were to be enforced in 
reality. He had heard that fishermen were now required to present themselves at the ranger 
posts located on various islands in the park to get permits to fish in the designated areas. P 
might also have been concerned by the possible consequences of encountering a patrol if 
caught fishing in prohibited waters.  
 When I spoke with P later in the year, he mentioned that a patrol of rangers had 
assaulted a relative when his bagan was stopped for inspection28. I had heard that the ranger in 
                                                 
28 One such instance of police brutality was reported in local newspapers when a captain and crew of a 
dive boat from Bali were beaten up by BRIMOB officers (Brigade Mobil, a paramilitary arm of the 
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question had been subject to disciplinary action from his commanding officer and was 
assured by an informant in TNC that such assaults were not routine. However, such reports of 
heavy handedness by enforcement personnel had already done its damage and further 
confirmed P’s skepticism about the true motives of TNC and its conservation measures.  
 That aside, P pointed out, enforcement of this policy was unfeasible from his point of 
view as a fisherman, on several accounts. Firstly, the zones were not physically marked in the 
sea, thus nobody really knew if they had strayed into a ‘forbidden’ zone, or indeed what 
‘zone’ they were in. These fishermen did not possess or use GPS or even maps to navigate 
within the KNP.  Secondly, the logistics of getting a boat to land to report to the ranger post is 
complicated as it would depend on navigating against tides and currents. Valuable time would 
be lost. Furthermore, as ranger posts were located few and far between, the distance 
fishermen had to travel from the fishing grounds to these ranger posts would entail additional 
fuel costs, which would have to be borne by the fishermen alone. Given that there are only 2 
patrol boats out at any time, most fishermen chose not to report to these ranger posts. In fact, 
many may have been simply unaware that these regulations existed.   
 P suggested that it would instead be easier if patrol boats approached fishing boats to 
check for permits as their boats were smaller and faster. Patrols could then radio back to 
ranger posts to see if these boats were indeed registered to fish in KNP waters. P was also 
frustrated by the lack of transparency and at the slow speed at which such information was 
being disseminated. E, an employee of TNC, assured that he would get members of the 
community outreach team to elaborate on the details. 
 A week later, two members of the community outreach team did indeed pay a visit to 
P. The meeting was held at P’s house and lasted about 30 minutes, consisting mostly of 
pleasantries. When P finally asked about the implementation of the zonation policy, H and W 
produced English pamphlets of the Zonation Information Sheet, illustrating the various zones. 
Eventually, what transpired was that the ‘rule of thumb’ for fishermen using traditional 
methods such as the bagan were allowed to fish anywhere within the park as long as it was 
‘deep enough’. H and W promised to ask another colleague of theirs from PHPA to speak to P 
because they felt that he would be more ‘knowledgeable’ and ‘helpful’. They left shortly 
after. P was clearly frustrated as he commented later that “if it takes 2 weeks to tell me how 
this zonation policy works, how long is it going to take to tell the other 800 fishermen that 
fish in KNP?”  
                                                                                                                                           
Indonesian police force) from a KNP patrol boat when they brought tourists into the park waters to 
dive (Fajar Bali 26//11/02). 
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 The lack of communication about this newest policy also seems to have to do with 
jurisdiction issues between TNC and PHPA. After adverse publicity from shooting incidents 
involving TNC commissioned patrol boats and fishermen from Sape, TNC has maintained 
consistently that it has no jurisdiction to make or enforce laws within the park, thus in this 
instance, preferring to defer to PHPA staff (how never came in the end) to provide 
information about these law under their jurisdiction. 
 The feasibility of the coastal zonation policy was again called into question by 
fishermen from Pulau Kukusan. According to Z, this policy was not feasible as fish are a 
mobile and seasonal resource. “Even if we are allowed to fish in a specific zone, what is the 
point when there are no fish for 6 months of the year in that zone? How are we to survive the 
rest of the year if we are only allowed to fish in one area?” Thus, there is little incentive (or 
sense) in forcing fishermen to keeping to these zones, since they restrict their catch and 
income. As shown earlier, KNP has also done little to facilitate the process. 
 Interestingly, fishermen could not agree on the level of fish stocks in KNP. P 
confided that it was getting increasingly difficult to fish as not only had fish stocks 
diminished but an increasing number of bagans from nearby Sape were coming into KNP to 
fish. Fish stocks in the Straits of Sape had been depleted severely in the last 10 years. The 
number of bagans being commissioned in KNP villages had also increased as the buyers were 
now coming to Labuan Bajo to buy fish. Depleting fish stocks were being depleted further by 
an increasing number of users.  
 Z and P, however, denied that there was a problem29. To them, the problem was the 
control over access to resources. They claimed that fish stocks were the same as 10 years ago 
and it was actually the recent imposition of controls that meant harvests had to be curtailed. 
Unsurprisingly, they were outspoken in their displeasure about TNC patrols. Another fisher, 
L suggested that fishermen would gladly take up the duty of patrolling surrounding waters if 
their fuel costs were covered. To Z, the ownership and management of resources should be 
the responsibility of the communities in KNP, not of “city people who know nothing about 
fishing [and] who have never lived their lives by the sea”.  
 
Expansion of the Park and the Problem of Compensation 
 
                                                 
29 Majors (in press) discusses a very similar type of disagreement about whether or not fish stocks were 
diminishing or not in Wakatobi Park in southern Sulawesi. He attributes this to indigenous belief 
systems about good and bad luck, as well as different techniques of fishing. 
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According to the Management Plan (PKA and TNC 2000a,b), prior to 1998, Komodo 
National Park occupied a total 1817 square kilometres with a population of 3267 people, with 
another 16 816 people living in  fishing villages surrounding the park (PKA and TNC 2000b: 
7). Within the park, Kampung Komodo on Pulau Komodo, Kampung Rinca and Kampung 
Kerora on Pulau Rinca, had a total population of 2310 individuals in 1996 (Bakar 1996:23). 
In 1998, a proposal to extend park boundaries increased the terrestrial area of KNP by 25 
square kilometres and its marine area by 1479 square kilometres to a total of 2321 square 
kilometres, increasing the number of settlements within KNP and its buffer zone to include 
the populations on Pulau Mesa and Pulau Papagaran. (PKA and TNC 2000a: 40) 
 By extending park boundaries to include marine areas, local marine communities who 
were formerly unaffected by national park regulations are now increasingly subject to state 
mechanisms of control and surveillance. Though it is questionable whether the state is 
physically able to enforce these boundaries in reality, territorial domination by the state 
means marine resources are now property of the state, indigenous concepts of property and 
access are now subsumed under these territorial controls.   
 Conversely, since boundaries by definition identify limits, rather than individual 
elements, communities will have a difficult time claiming compensation on the various items 
and property lost through the boundary setting exercise. In the case of Pulau Rinca the 
problem of compensation arises when remuneration is demanded from the national park in 
terms of property lost, rather than of space lost. Space itself was not considered a commodity, 
rather, the items that occupied the space— fruit trees, buffalo, horses, vegetable gardens etc. 
were considered of value. Thus, though the space might be small, the value of the elements 
within it could be considerable. The problem thus is putting a value on items that were never 
previously commoditized. 
 The case of Bapak Steph and his horses present an interesting example of how 
national park creation as well as subsequent park policies have affected land ownership and 
the way of life on Rinca. He has been seeking compensation for the loss of his horses since 
Rinca was declared a national park, a matter his father had pursued continuously till his death 
in 1984. Bapak Steph’s father was posted to Rinca by the central government in 1949 to open 
a primary school in Kampong Kerora. According to Bapak Steph’s father, there had been 
people living on Rinca since the 1920s. The horses had been brought to Rinca from Warloka 
as dowry by one of the villages for his prospective wife’s family. However, the family 
declined the gifts. Being fisherfolk, they could see no use for the horses. The six horses had 
been purchased at great expense and could not be returned. The desperate man appealed to 
Bapak Steph’s father to buy these horses from him so he could recoup his losses. The village 
headman also offered him land to keep and water these horses. Bapak Steph’s accepted the 
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village headman’s offer and took the horses. Bapak Steph also hired several villagers to look 
after his horses. The land he was given had a well (or spring) where the horses could drink 
and a total area of 25 000 hectares. The horses thrived and by 1965, the population of horses 
had swelled to about 60. With Indonesian independence, Rinca was declared part of the state 
and shortly after, part of the komodo national park. 
 With the declaration of Rinca as a national park, the park authorities claimed that all 
the land, with the exception of the land the village was standing on, now belonged to the state. 
Villagers lost all the land they had previously cultivated with coconut, jackfruit, citrus fruit 
(jeruk) and teak. They could not even harvest the wood from the mature teak trees that they 
had been growing for 40 years. The water source on Bapak Steph’s land was sealed, the park 
authorities claiming that they wanted to build pipes so the whole village could benefit from it. 
(However, so far, only Loh Liang benefits from water on Rinca.) This made it impossible for 
the horses to be confined and they were released to forage on their own. Many buffalo were 
also left to roam free as they were no longer needed to plough the fields. Some villagers 
wanted to slaughter the animals for meat later on but were told that these animals were now 
part of the national park and according to national park regulations, no ‘wildlife’ could be 
harmed.  
 According to Indonesian law, people living within the park have the right to use the 
natural resources. Park authorities were obliged to share information and co-operate with the 
local people. Local people were also entitled to compensation for all property lost to the 
national park. According to Bapak Steph, should any of these conditions fail to be met, the 
establishment of the park fails to be legal. Bapak Steph’s father has sought compensation for 
lost land and horses for more than two decades.  Other villagers are also seeking 
compensation for lost land and for the feral buffalo. They are apparently awaiting the capture 
of all the heads of buffalo so that a final account can be made. There are also 31 people who 
own land on Rinca who have gone uncompensated.   
Before his father passed away, he had actually written to various levels of 
government stating his claim for compensation. His extensive research revealed that in the 
legislation for the Komodo National Park, only Pulau Komodo had been designated for 
conservation efforts. Indeed Pulau Rinca and Padar were not included in the proposed area at 
all. Bapak Steph’s father kept extensive notes on his research and each meeting with local 
officials were minuted carefully. Inaction at a local government level left him feeling 
extremely frustrated. This culminated in three trips to Jakarta to meet the director general of 
the Department of Forestry (PHPA) himself, Widodo. His father’s claims were finally 
acknowledged to be legitimate and negotiations on the precise amount for compensation were 
to proceed. Widodo requested that the issue not be exposed to the mass media, presumably so 
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that the issue could be settled quietly. Bapak Steph pointed out that if the issue was revealed, 
it would mean that PHPA had actually broken the law to acquire the land and would have to 
be punished in court. Meanwhile, back in Labuan Bajo, the local PHPA authorities sought to 
settle the issue, hoping that a symbolic Rp 5 million would be sufficient. Bapak Steph was 
offended because the negotiations promised did not take place. The approach the PHKA had 
taken also offended him—it was as if he was being offered bride price (mas kawin), with the 
presentation of wine (arak), a gold ring, amongst other traditional Javanese wedding gifts. 
Bapak Steph was upset because he felt he was not being taken seriously. Furthermore, these 
offerings were part of Javanese culture, not even Manggarai culture. The last straw was that it 
was not even the PHPA who had made the offering but the district office (camat). It seemed 
that the local politician was hoping to get electorate support for being the person who ‘settled’ 
the issue.  
The longer such outstanding issues remain unsettled increases the probablility that 
claimants such as Bapak Steph will lose out in in the long run. However, growing awareness 
about the profitability of tourism, in particular a drive towards resort tourism means that the 
looming threat of further economic marginalization might be imminent when even significant 
claims such as Bapak Steph’s remain unresolved. This territorialization of the park might 
have deeper implications for local communities in the long run, especially for issues like land 
tenure and property rights.  
 
Conflict, Violence and the Dragon Princess of Komodo 
 
Substantial debate surrounded the implementation of the plan that was designed by TNC to 
‘collaborate’ in the management of the park. Much discussion was generated due to the lack 
of transparency of the planning process. Local groups were most concerned about the 
partnership that TNC proposed in the management of the park with a Malaysian businessman; 
the plan was to create a ‘joint venture’, and this joint venture was to form a private limited 
company by the name of PT Putri Naga Komodo- The Dragon Princess of Komodo Pte. Ltd. 
The circumstances of this partnership was shrouded in secrecy and though ostensibly the 
company was repeatedly declared as non-profit, many suspected that this partnership was a 
vehicle for the businessman to gain a foothold in the tourism industry in Labuan Bajo. As 
mentioned earlier, stakeholder consultations held by TNC during the period of 1996 and 2003 
show that concern for the lack of transparency about this collaboration was raised frequently 
(PKA & TNC 2003) . 
However, the shooting of two unarmed fishermen from Sape on the 11th of November 
2002 by a TNC sponsored patrol team (Gaung NTB 12/11/02) provoked strong reactions 
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from communities in Sape and Labuan Bajo and catapulted the issues of TNC’s capability to 
manage KNP into local, regional and international press. TNC’s office in Sape was destroyed 
by almost a hundred angry villagers from Desa Bajo Pulo, Labuan and Soro. The Sape 
harbour was also blocked by angry villagers demanding that action be taken against the 
shooters (Gaung NTB 21/11/02). One respondent noted that the consequences of this 
blockage were felt in Labuan Bajo when salt from Bima could not leave and many 
households in Labuan Bajo could not salt their catch for the next few days. 
The public outrage generated by these demonstrations prompted TNC to send a 
delegation of “community representatives” to Jakarta to show that TNC’s presence in KNP 
was still supported by local communities. The leaders of the Association of Tour Guides in 
Manggarai ( Himpunan Pariwisata Indonesia, Kabupaten Manggarai/ HPI),Self-Help Group 
of Labuan Bajo ( Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat Labuan Bajo/ KSM) and the Tourism 
Interest Group ( Kelompok Peduli Pariwisata/ KPP) were sent to Jakarta by TNC to meet 
with the Minister of Forestry. These groups later denounced the actions of their leaders, 
leading newspapers to conclude that this trip was another manipulation tactic by TNC to 
engineer the perception of support for the collaboration between TNC and KNP (Fajar Bali 
2/12/02, Flores Pos 3/12/02). 
On 12 December 2002, the Director General of the Department of Forestry and Nature 
Conservation (PHKA) arrived in Labuan Bajo for an open dialogue session pertaining to the 
issue of the TNC-KNP collaboration. He was met in Labuan Bajo with demonstrations by 
groups against TNC’s presence in the park, numerous posters and banners proclaiming 
“Reject TNC’s version of collaboration” and demonstrators chanting “ Don’t sell Komodo 
National Park, we reject the collaboration” (Flores Pos 13/12/02).  The newspaper report 
notes that there were no similar demonstrations of support for the collaboration. Opposers of 
the collaboration had six points of protest, namely that 
1. the collaboration with the private company Putri Naga Komodo be removed from the 
management plan; 
2. the rights to and authority of the management of KNP be retained by the park 
authority, Balai Taman Nasional Komodo, and that the skill and technical level of 
TNK be improved; 
3. TNC is questioned about the progress of its programme for the past 7 years in KNP, 
in particular investigated for the many cases of the shooting of fishermen in the park; 
4. TNC stops the practice of manipulation, lies, fragmentation and harassment of the 
local communities; 
5. alternative methods of management such as the one in Bunakken National Park be 
used in KNP; 
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6. the Ministry of Forestry really take note of the aspirations and concerns of the people 
when making decisions (ibid). 
However, this “open” dialogue session was heavily guarded, with a restricted “guest list”. 
Many community members who had wanted to voice their concerns and grievances such as 
Pak Steph Syukur  and his claims on Rinca, were turned away by security forces. Apparently 
the park authority did not allow the public to attend this dialogue session unless they had been 
issued invitations (Flores Pos 16/12/02). This was yet another sore point with many local 
people and in their eyes, further evidence that TNC was clearly trying to misrepresent public 
opinion of the collaboration. 
Support for TNC’s management plan was particularly crucial at this point because 
according to its director of the Asia Pacific Coastal and Marine Programme, Dr Rili Djohani, 
the management collaboration between KNP and TNC was till December 2002. When 
interviewed by local newspaper, Flores Post, she said that the Management Plan had not been 
approved by the central government at that point, despite approval from the Bupati, head of 
the local parliament in Manggarai and community groups. She cited support from from 
approximately 25 other groups from the islands and Labuan Bajo, HPI, KSM, youth groups 
and kader konservasi? amongst them (Flores Pos 17/12/02). However, despite the 
demonstrations in Labuan Bajo, the director general publicly declared his support for the 
collaboration and believed that this would be a good model for the rest of Indonesia to follow 
(ibid).  
The show of official support for TNC-KNP collaboration galvanised much public 
sentiment that the central government had little interest in community aspirations, and that 
TNC’s promise of funding was more important to the regional and local government than its 
plan’s impact on local livelihoods. Local NGOs who had been active in opposing the 
collaboration prior to the shootings, now laden with new ammunition, continued to campaign 
against the collaboration in various forms, forming alliances with national NGOs.  
The death of the fishermen in the course of enforcement of park regulations caused 
much concern. The tactics were decried as being typical of those used during the New Order 
(Fajar Bali 16/11/02). As these patrols were used to protect the flora and fauna of the park in 
the name of conservation, the report felt that TNC should take moral responsibility as the 
shootings were in the name of conservation. The article concluded if TNC continued to be 
implicated in such encounters, that they should be chased out of the park (ibid). In February 
2003, another two fishermen were shot at by patrols for illegally taking corals and fish from 
the park. Since 1982, twenty-six fishermen have died in the park- twelve were shot by 
security forces, including the two fishermen from Sape in November 2002. TNC was 
criticized for supporting enforcement patrols with a known history of brutality. TNC was also 
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criticised for not allowing room for dialogue and bribing selected villagers with economic 
incentives for their support where they wanted to carry out conservation programmes. 
Traditional fishers were being penalised by park regulations and to compete for livelihoods 
with other fishers from outside the park, were being forced to use destructive methods of 
fishing. (Kompas, 7/4/03) 
The debate quickly evolved into a question of morality about the human cost of 
conservation. In a commentary piece, journalist Agust G Thuru questioned if the price of 
human life should be more important than the lobster trade in Manggarai, arguing that human 
life cannot be commoditised unlike the rights to the islands, Komodo dragons that have been 
valued for trillions of rupiah. He argues that if trafficking in human life carries a heavy 
sentence in human rights courts, thus murder, for whatever reason must also be heavily 
punished. However, in KNP this is not the case as it seems to be “a state within a state” with 
its own laws, where the body count has sharply increased since TNC arrived in the park and 
such offences go unpunished. He concludes life in Komodo is cheap, to be precise- as he titles 
his article- “91 lobsters for the price of the lives of 2 Sape fishermen”. (Fajar Bali, date 
unknown). 
His article sums up the views of many respondents I spoke to in the course of my 
fieldwork. Many people mentioned that human rights should not be compromised in the name 
of conservation and this case was a clear infringement of Human Rights30. The contemporary 
human rights perspective states that all people are entitled to equal rights in their 
communities, in particular, people should have agency in the face of power. Briefly, the 
Western31 concept of Human Rights is built upon the notion of human dignity where a 
utilitarian value cannot be put on human life. These rights are inalienable and thus must take 
priority over all other moral, political and economic goals (ibid: 26). 
                                                 
30 Human Rights discourse is a powerful ideology in Indonesia, the use and abuse of power being 
closely linked to New Order government of Suharto (see Vatikiotis 1993, Anwar 2005). The 
emergence of popular movements demanding decentralization and democratization in 1997-1999 
resulted in the central government granting regions local autonomy under law no. 22/1999. 
Decentralization was synonymous with the expectation of better government, better public services, 
greater prosperity, more justice and equality, all of which were lacking during the Suharto regime 
(Pratikno 2005: 21). 
31 Sachs examines the genealogy of human rights rhetoric in the West and its evolution into 
international politics, with the development of laws and courts to address the atrocities during the 
Second World War and subsequent acts of war, especially the Cold War (Sachs 2003:26-29). 
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Sachs observes that increasingly development practices are being replaced by a 
rights- centred approach that addresses the root of poverty as a lack of power, rather than a 
failure to fulfil basic needs (ibid: 31). This is especially crucial for ecological subsistence, 
where Sach notes  
 
“The reference to rights- even human rights- strengthens the position of the poor, 
since rights can be claimed before courts and are not chargeable. Rights generate 
duties, needs and… active solidarity. Anyone who speaks of rights asserts that certain 
institutions and authorities have an obligation to give an account of themselves; the 
language of rights strengthens the power of the marginalized (ibid).” 
 
More importantly, a human rights approach to the issues facing KNP empowers local 
communities with the legitimacy to act against powerful institutions, namely TNC, the 
Ministry of Forestry and PHKA. It also provides them with a common platform to access 
resources that were previously unavailable. Rosse and Sikkin discuss this “boomerang” 
pattern of influence when local group bypass the repressive state in search of partnerships 
with international allies to apply external pressure on the state through partnerships with 
national opposition groups, NGOs and social movements with access to transnational 
networks and INGOs. Such allies bring access to networks that provide resources such as 
money and political leverage, more importantly, amplifying the demands of domestic groups, 
enlarging space for negotiation before echoing these demands back to the local arena (Rosse 
and Sikkink 1999: 18). 
The human rights story-line has been well used in the debate against TNC presence in 
the park. The use of this common platform enables local NGOs to form partnerships with 
national NGOs to access the legal, technical and political capabilities these NGOs possess. 
National NGOs also tap local expertise and contacts to lend support to larger causes and 
campaigns; the case of KNP has been used in several of WALHI’s ongoing campaigns. Local 
NGOs in Labuan Bajo are loosely aligned, often forming coalitions to protest against 
common interests (such as to demonstrate at the Director General’s visit to Labuan Bajo in 
December 2002).  One such NGO, the Komodo Watch was part of an advocacy team sent to 
Jakarta to query KNP management tactics and the shootings  by WALHI, Indonesia’s largest 
conglomerate of environmental NGOs in March 2003.  This team comprised of other local 
and national environmental NGOs, as well as human rights NGOs. The team was concerned 
with bringing the parties responsible for the shootings to justice, eliminating the proposed 
expansion of the KNP, as well as urging the government to reject TNC’s presence in the park 
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due to its heavy handed and opaque management style32. WALHI also has ties with the 
Fisherman’s Solidarity Group (NUANSA- Himpunan Nelayan Bersatu), whose head, 
Florianus Adu is currently part of WALHI’s Working Group Conservancy for People33.  
However, the use of the human rights story-line also was used to further political 
agendas of various leaders, who believed that a large number of sympathisers would also 
mean a good pool of voters in local political elections.  As one of the most vocal opponents to 
the collaboration, Florianus Adu, is also the head of the organization for community advocacy 
(Lembaga Pemberdayaan Advokasi Masyarakat Labuan Bajo/ LPAM) and leader of the anti- 
TNC demonstrations during the director-general’s visit. He was also campaigning actively for 
the rights of fishermen in the park, forming NUANSA. However, respondents I spoke to 
viewed his goals as not quite altruistic. Adu had managed to gain the support of several 
powerful businessmen in the islands and was being funded by them to campaign for the rights 
of fishermen in KNP. One respondent believed that he was actually using the support to gain 
a foothold into politics, his real agenda being securing a position in the district parliament 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah). Adu was not a fisherman or a resident in KNP. He was 
a Manggaraian from Labuan Bajo and the son of a prominent local. Ironically, Adu had 
sought employment with TNC but he did not have the relevant qualifications and was not 
hired, becoming eventually, one of TNC’s most vocal attackers. 
During my fieldwork in 2003, many respondents I spoke to felt indifferent towards 
the renewed interest in the ‘plight’ of KNP. Many of them distrusted all these “LSM-LSM” 
(Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat or Self help Groups/ NGOs). Several respondents mentioned 
they felt that these organizations caused trouble, as they would often start demonstrations 
over various issues pertaining to TNC and its presence in the park. What respondents found 
especially discouraging was that many of the ‘protesters’ were paid by LSMs to demonstrate. 
During my fieldwork in October 2003, villagers from Pulau Batu, a small island off Pulau 
Papagarang had been forced to leave the island34 sparking several demonstrations in Labuan 
Bajo. According to eye witnesses, a demonstration outside TNC office was believed to have 
been instigated by an outsider (i.e. a non resident) working for a major NGO. This 
                                                 
32 For fuller details on WALHI’s Conservation Areas and Conflict campaign, see 
http://www.walhi.or.id/kampanye/hutan/konservasi/reform_huk_advocasi_masy_kom_sp_120303, see 
also the write up on the website of Down to Earth, an international campaign for ecological justice 
project based in UK http://dte.gn.apc.org/57Kom.htm). 
33 See WALHI’s homepage http://www.walhi.or.id/kampanye/hutan/konservasi/050714_wgcop_ps/ 
34 This was initially assumed to be due to TNC but later believed to be by the district office (camat) 
acting independently.  
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‘provocateur’ was believed to have paid fishermen from nearby islands Rp 50 000 each to 
sign a petition to oust TNC from the park and protest outside its office. The demonstrators 
had also been promised lunch and that their fuel costs from their village in KNP would be 
covered. Other fishermen thought they were genuinely campaigning against what had 
happened on Pulau Batu, however, they left when they found out that the demonstration was 
not about Pulau Batu per se. Some were disgusted when they found out that others had been 
paid to demonstrate and left. Come lunch time, many left the demonstration site, as there was 
no sign of lunch and or payment.  
In this way, the story-line has not really empowered local communities in terms of 
their rights to access resources, though it has brought much national and international 
attention to the park. Locals I spoke to in Laban Bajo felt that such activities bred hostility 
between residents as resentment would build against those who could be ‘bought’, be it by 
TNC or other organizations. It also fragmented the solidarity of the communities as members 
felt they would never really know the real agendas of campaigners or campaigning 
organisations.  
The Human Rights story-line can also be alienating as it positions local communities 
as powerless and helpless, in need of external help to get their rights recognised. Where TNC 
portrays fishers as lowly educated and ignorant, the human rights story line casts them in the 
role of victims. Furthermore, with the focus on holding TNC accountable for the dismal state 
of affairs in KNP, the larger issue of intensifying competition for fish stocks and loss of 
property rights to park expansion ( and land speculators in Labuan Bajo35) takes a back seat.  
In an interview with a village head and his brother, they felt there was a need to 
reclaim their identity, by rejecting the story line of ‘ignorance’ by TNC. The storyline of their  
search (or re-affirmation) of identity was also important in the face of the creeping threat of 
materialism that was spreading in the park from tourism, or unscrupulous opponents of TNC 
or from TNC itself. Their village in particular has been particularly vocal about its opposition 
to TNC’s presence in the park.  J and H maintain that sea people are self-sufficient, 
hardworking people as sea people are proud to live by the sea, a lifestyle that requires much 
skill and intelligence to survive. The introduction of terms such as “lacking” (kurang) and 
“poor/ miserable” (miskin), they believe, erode the sense of pride and identity of sea people, 
                                                 
35 In April 2006, Pulau Bidadari, an island off Labuan Bajo and a popular recreation spot for locals, 
was sold to an English couple for 495 million rupiah (Kompas 24/2/2006). This is an alarming 
development as many of the land claims within the park and Labuan Bajo are traditional ones, with 
little or no documentation. As many claimants cannot afford or do not know of the notarization 
process, land claims are becoming an increasingly contentious issue in Labuan Bajo.  
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as it focuses on their lack of material comforts. J, in particular is afraid that this will cause 
young people to focus only on money and neglect their obligations and customs to their 
families and to the village. Recently, a school was built on the island, however, J, finds 
secular education lacking, favouring a religious education which instils (Islamic) values in the 
students.  
“ Government schools teach children about reward and punishment only. Many 
children do not like to go to school because they get punished, so they stay at home. 
What they study is also not relevant to them here, how many of them will go to high 
school even?... Some of them help their fathers fishing at night, so they skip school 
because they are tired… That’s why some children don’t like school and don’t 
come… Their grandparents often are left to discipline them, but it’s not effective. So 
their biggest influence is their friends… Even the women can’t teach their children 
much as they don’t have much guidance and are often helping their husbands. There 
is no women’s group here to discuss such things…Parents here teach nothing to their 
children… Religion is not followed because of the work of the fishermen who fish at 
night and sleep in the day, therefore most of them do not pray in the day or have the 
time to teach their children.,, When there is a school, parents forget the need for 
strong family socialization… they forget the importance of adat… Money becomes 
the most important thing.” 
J was particularly concerned that there was growing materialism amongst the young in the 
village today, some of whom go into debt or become alcoholics. He believed the solution was 
an Islamic education and during my visit, was searching for a female religious teacher to 
come to the newly built school. (The previous male religious teacher had an affair with one of 
the village girls and was sacked.) The idea was that a female teacher would also be able to 
guide the women in the village, who in turn can be better role models for their children. He 
believed that students grounded in religious values will be better able to withstand the ‘bad 
influences’ that come with Labuan Bajo being a tourist town. I asked him why an Islamic 
identity, rather than a Bajo identity? He says that many of the old traditions have been lost 
and very few are practised any more. Furthermore, not all the villagers are Bajo and Islam 
was a better unifying factor as almost all of the villagers are Muslim. J believed that a strong 
identity was the key to empowering the village. (However, he also mentioned that nine 
families had left because of differences in opinion on this issue.) In co-operation with local 
NGO, ASPRIDA, there were aspirations that the village would be able to market their island 
as an eco-tourism and research destination for divers and scientists, improving the standard of 
living of the village, a plan very similar to TNC’s aspirations for the park. However, if this 
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could be achieved independently, it would be a symbol of resistance to TNC’s management in 
KNP.  In 2003, this village was working with ASPRIDA, a local NGO to build capacity. 
ASPRIDA, a Ruteng based organization, was run by a group of full time activists36 
who were also heavily involved in other activist and political associations. The organization 
was also concerned with the protection and recognition of rights of local communities, as well 
as providing some technical assistance to local communities hoping to manage their own 
projects. The primary goal of ASPRIDA was to empower local communities to conceptualize 
and manage their own projects based on the real needs of the community, rather than to be 
subject to the agendas and plans of ‘outside’ forces. It was in this capacity that they lent their 
assistance to the village head of Pulau Kukusan in KNP.  
J mentioned that they had chosen to work with ASPRIDA as he did not believe in 
working with big NGOs. He believed that NGOs that had a lot of money must be taking 
money from the poor and thus, corrupt. J and H believed that villages had to stand up for 
themselves and source for their own sources of funding in order to show TNC that they were 
not needed in KNP. Speaking to a respondent from ASPRIDA, I discovered J was also 
running for a position in the district parliament in 2004. I am guessing that ASPRIDA, with 
its many connections to political parties in Ruteng, would have provided J a good means to 
network. In 2005, according to another informant, ASPRIDA was no longer working with this 
village as village leaders “had their own ideas of what they want”. ASPRIDA itself was no 
longer active as many of its members were working for political parties in the lead up to the 




Locals thus find themselves entangled in the storylines woven around their perceived position 
within the KNP debate which are then used to mobilize popular support for multiple agendas. 
Villager such as J and H have to come up with alternative storylines of identity that are 
familiar to their fellow villagers in their attempt to resist TNC’s storyline of local’s ignorance 
of conservation, whilst generating solidarity for their own political gains. The attraction of a 
strengthened Islamic identity is also powerful in the light of recent world events, in particular 
the unilateral decision by America to invade Iraq in March 2003, in some way mirroring the 
                                                 
36 By ‘full time’ activists,  I mean that activism took up the bulk of their time. Some were employed in 
a formal capacity by the (mostly political) organizations they were affiliated to but most considered 
activism their primary occupation, falling back on harvests from their share of agricultural land for 
subsistence. 
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American NGO’s actions in the park. Issues of identity are thus relatively new to the struggle 
of storylines. Despite the diversity of park residents within KNP, the development of 
identities based on residence, ethnicity or religion was unnecessary in the absence of the 
storyline of an external threat, be it from TNC, NGOs or other more nebulous forces such as 
materialism. Thus the storyline of identity is a seen as a tacit form of resistance and rallying 
point for solidarity for many actors who use the park debate as a vehicle in achieving other 
goals. 
In this chapter, I have examined the problems surrounding the conceptualization and 
subsequent implementation of the Management Plan in Komodo National Park. TNC’s wilful 
ignorance and reluctance to fully engage communities has resulted in an ugly backlash of 
public sentiment when its patrol shot two fishermen in November 2002. However, I have 
attempted to show the ways that this shooting was crucial in drawing national and 
international attention to the situation in KNP, through the use of a human rights storyline. I 
also show that community interests can also be fragmented as storylines are also used by 
members of the community to mobilize support for their own political agendas. Community 
solidarity is thus fragmented, and in the end, the situation of communities in TNC does not 
improve as the actual issues of depleting fish stocks, outstanding claims and lack of financial 
institutions are not addressed, as most storylines are focussed in garnering support for the 
ousting of TNC from the park. So even with this heightened interest in the conflict that faces 
the communities KNP, it remains to be seen if there will be any concrete positive 
improvement for the bulk of the people eking out a living in the seas of KNP. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have attempted to present a case of conservation management in a national 
park that has been very controversial in the late 20th and early 21st century. Over the past 
decade conservation is being discussed as a matter of increasing urgency.  
I have attempted to provide a holistic account of the situation in Komodo National 
Park using a diversity of approaches under the broad umbrella of politic ecology (Bryant and 
Bailey 1997: 23-26)- looking at a specific environmental problem, its discourse development, 
the capitalist relations that frame the socio-economic characteristics of the communities, and 
the distinct aims and interests of actors involved. Drawing from political economy, I also 
attempt to show how the economic and political interests of developed countries continue to 
eclipse those of developing ones such as Indonesia through financial aid. 
As a starting point, I deconstruct the specific environmental problem of biodiversity 
loss. In chapter two, I attempted to show that recent attempts at creating Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) have failed due to the basic assumption that 
biodiversity loss is a direct result of resource exploitation by local communities. The use of 
biodiversity discourse continues to prevail as its networks of international NGOs, scientists 
and consultants, continue to couch the issue of biodiversity as a matter of neutral scientific 
fact, requiring urgent action at any cost, simultaneously devolving management of 
biodiversity resources from the state. In chapter three, I show that environmental funds such 
as the Global Environment Facility undermined any real drive to create a more equitable 
conservation paradigm, as accountability is ultimately to treasuries in the World Bank and 
donor nations, who still continue to consume the bulk of natural resources in the world. 
Despite being a conservation heavyweight, The Nature Conservancy seems to ignore 
this fundamental link between the inequitable consumption of natural resources in developed 
countries and the continued loss of biological diversity in developing countries, instead 
choosing to focus on expanding their ecological fiefdoms in developing countries, implying 
that it is local communities that biodiversity has to be saved from.  In Komodo National Park, 
TNC has implemented their plans without proper collaboration with local communities, and 
in fact made members of the local communities appear to be the criminals in the destruction 
of the environment.  
Though community complexities in biodiversity conservation projects have been 
discussed extensively, it is also important to note that resistance to conservation projects is 
equally fragmented. In chapter four, the power relations within the communities in KNP were 
the key to understanding resource allocation within the park and the more pressing underlying 
problem of commercial fishing. Chapter five illustrates how a vocal minority mobilised the 
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discourse of human rights violation to ostensibly denounce TNC management tactics, while 
advancing their political agendas and protecting their economic interests. The locals 
attempted to show that they have their own agenda for conservation, and this needs to be 
freed from the ‘eco-imperial’ control of international conservation organizations. Rallying 
around ideas of ‘indigenous rights’, and ‘human rights violations’, local communities attempt, 
in their use of various ‘story lines’, to turn the tables on hard line conservation organization 
tactics, implicating them, instead, as the ‘criminals’. By utilizing the networks of both local 
and international NGOs to make their objections heard, they were able to garner sufficient 
resources to draw attention to the fracas in KNP. The voices of the majority of residents in the 
park, who suffer the brunt of conservation regulation, however, remain silent and 
unrepresented due to their marginal economic position37.  
  Conservation programmes will continue to face similar problems as long as 
storylines about biodiversity conservation continue to place blame solely on the shoulders of 
developing countries and its peoples. Communities will continue to aspire to improving their 
standard of living and restricting their development is a myopic and spurious solution to 
larger environmental issues. In this light, there can be no real ‘partnership’ in conservation as 
long as biodiversity continues to be a storyline to further greater economic or political 
agendas, whilst ignoring larger economic pressures.  
Biodiversity conservation measures should not be conceptualized as localized 
solutions such as protected areas, rather it is biodiversity consumption that should be fully 
traced and understood, showing the flow of resources between developed and developing 
world whilst taking into account the political economy of debt that has cornered developing 
countries into focusing on primary industries. Indonesia, one of the most debt stressed 
countries in the world, is most in need of hard currency export revenues, and until it can 
resolve its financial obligations to donor nations, it will continue exploiting its natural 
resources in its ‘last great places’ to service its debts and maintain its balance of payments.  
 
                                                 
37 However, that is not to say that there is no resistance by subordinate groups. Low profile forms of 
resistance such as rumour, gossip and euphemisms were rife. Such symbolic defiance is ‘prudent by 
design, unobtrusive and veiled… any public defiance of the material of the symbolic order. When, 
however the pressure rises or when there are weaknesses to the ‘retaining wall’ holding it back, 
escalation results…’ (Scott 1991: 18) In the case of KNP, this esclation has occurred in the form of 
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